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Abstract  
 
 
Although Germany has had a long history of restrictive and uncoordinated immigration 
and integration policies, the country seemed to experience a paradigm shift during the 
refugee crisis in 2014/15. In the light of unprecedented support from actors across the 
political spectrum, the country introduced a variety of pro-refugee policies, actively 
welcoming and integrating refugees. However, this approach was ephemeral. Shortly 
after the initiation of the aforementioned liberal agenda, the country reversed its approach 
introducing a number of conservative policies outsourcing migration control, increasing 
refugee responsibilities, and decreasing requirements for deportation and repatriation. 
This thesis investigates the dynamics of Germany’s refugee policy making by analyzing 
(1) the initial liberal reaction, followed by (2) the shift to less liberal policies. The 
empirical findings illustrate that actors utilized different sets of norms in order to advance 
their preferred policy response during the decision making process. The incompleteness 
of rule systems and the existence of overlapping refugee and asylum norms on different 
levels of analysis led to arguments amongst different actors on how to interpret norms 
and which policies to implement. Further, both logics of appropriateness and logics of 
consequences figured centrally in public debates which confirms that policy decisions are 
a product of mixed motives.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
Overview 
Germany has had a long history of restrictive immigration policies as well as 
disconnected and neglected refugee integration measures. This is reflected in numerous 
conservative citizenship and residency laws, deportation procedures, and repatriation 
agreements with home or third countries. While the introduction of the National 
Integration Plan (NAP) in 2005 signaled initial steps toward a more progressive 
approach to immigration, politicians across the political spectrum continued to push for 
conservative measures.1  
With the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, the country seemed to 
experience a paradigm shift. Germany initiated unprecedented liberal migration policies 
accompanied by a pronounced Willkommenskultur. However, this approach proved 
ephemeral. Shortly after the introduction of the aforementioned liberal response, the 
country reversed its approach, reinstating a number of rather restrictive policies 
outsourcing migration control, increasing refugee responsibilities, and decreasing 
requirements for deportation and repatriation.   
This study investigates the dynamics of Germany’s refugee policy making by 
explaining (1) the initial liberal reaction, followed by (2) the shift to more conservative 
policies. I argue that Germany’s introduction of liberal refugee policies as well as the 
shift back to more restrictive policies are the result of actors utilizing different sets of 
                                                          
1 Petra Bendel, Coordinating immigrant integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the federal and local 
levels, (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute, 2014): 1-3. 
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norms. The liberal policy response as well as the return to a conservative agenda 
illustrates how both logics of appropriateness and logics of consequences played a role 
in the decision making processes.  
In the following sections of the introduction, I will first offer a brief empirical 
background on the development of Germany’s policies with regards to the current 
refugee crisis, before identifying the puzzles and the theoretical framework. I will then 
proceed to discuss the significance of the study, the methodological approach and 
finally provide a chapter overview.  
Empirical Background 
As a result of economic and political insecurity in the Middle East and many 
North African countries, more and more refugees started migrating towards Europe in 
2014. The Dublin System of the European Union required that the asylum status of 
migrants be determined in the first European country of arrival. While especially 
peripheral countries responsible for carrying the majority of the asylum burden have 
criticized this system for its asymmetry for decades, Dublin’s unsustainability became 
evident during spring and summer 2015.2 The number of newly arriving refugees 
overwhelmed EU states bordering on the Mediterranean. Faced with a humanitarian 
crisis and a failed European asylum system, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
announced the suspension of Dublin, guaranteeing refugees a safe and legal passage 
throughout Europe.3 This sparked an unprecedented Willkommenskultur (welcoming 
                                                          
2 Ferruccio Pastore and Giulia Henry, "Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum 
Regime," The International Spectator 51 (2016): 50-51. 
3 Matthew Holehouse, Justin Huggler, and Andrea Vogt, "Germany Drops EU Rules to Allow in Syrian 
Refugees," The Telegraph, August 24, 2015, 1.  
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culture) within Germany, triggering the emergence of numerous pro-refugee groups and 
clubs and overwhelmingly positive attitudes.4 Though other European countries seemed 
reluctant and somewhat irritated with Germany’s liberal approach, the German 
government defended its decision and continued to push for a humanitarian response 
throughout Europe. Germany’s reaction was seen as inspiring by countries such as the 
United States and Canada, placing the country in a global leadership role with regards 
to the refugee crisis. However, with the intensification of the refugee influx, Germany’s 
liberal refugee policy course was ephemeral.  
As early as fall 2015, the German Congress started discussing restrictions to 
existing immigration and asylum policies in order to deter new refugees from coming 
and to accelerate asylum procedures and deportations. One of the first measures that the 
German Congress passed was the so-called “Asylum Packages I and II” (Asylpakete I 
und II).5 Both packages include stricter right to stay and easier deportation 
requirements. Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro as well as the Maghreb6 states were 
declared “safe countries of origin” aiming at expediting the asylum process and 
simplifying repatriations.7 In addition to the two asylum packages, the right to stay was 
further restricted in order to enable termination of residency of long-term tolerated 
individuals, a reentry ban, and the deportation of criminal foreigners who were 
                                                          
4 Josef Joffe, "Das Deutsche Wunder," Zeit Online, September 12, 2015, 1, accessed October 12, 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/2015/37/willkommenskultur-deutschland-fluechtlinge-zeitgeist. 
5 Asylgesetz (AsylG) [Asylum Act] §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 18a, 25, 30a, 31, 44, 47, 59, 60 
6 Maghreb refers to the region of Northwest Africa and includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and 
Mauretania.  
7 Katharina Schuler, "Viel Härte, Wenig Wirkung,"Die Zeit, February 25, 2016, n.p., accessed 
July 25, 2016, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-02/asylpaket-ii-abschiebungen-
familiennachzug.  
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sentenced to a minimum of one year.8 Finally, just a few months following Merkel’s 
public invitation welcoming all refugees into Germany, the country reestablished border 
controls.9  Therefore, the country’s development of refugee policies throughout 2015-
2016 poses the following two research questions: 1) why was Germany’s initial reaction 
to the refugee crisis so liberal, especially considering the country’s rather conservative 
past approaches, and 2) why was this liberal approach reversed and replaced by a more 
restrictive system?  
Puzzles and Theoretical Framework 
 This thesis addresses two distinct but related puzzles evident in Germany’s 
response to the refugee crisis. First, from a rationalist perspective, it is puzzling why 
Germany would reverse its traditional, conservative approach to asylum and initiate, in 
material terms, a costly open door policy framework. A rationalist investigation might 
point to the economic benefits such as the influx of skilled workers, the long-term 
contributions to the social security system, and balancing decreasing birth rates. 
However, this explanation is incomplete at best as it fails to account for why the 
German government did not initiate liberal policies earlier to attract regular rather than 
irregular migrants. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that material factors 
played a peripheral role in the initial decision making process. Hence, constructivist 
theories provide better tools to help explain how the different sets of norms interacted 
during the initial policy decision making process.10 In reality, actors across the political 
                                                          
8 "Straffällige Ausländer Leichter Ausweisen," Bundesregierung, last modified March 17, 2016, 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/01/2016-01-27-straffaellige-auslaender.html. 
9 "Deutschland führt Grenzkontrollen wieder ein," Zeit Online, September 13, 2015, 1, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-09/fluechtlinge-grenzkontrollen-oesterreich.  
10 Christian Reus-Smit, “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of 
Fundamental Institutions,” International Organization 51, no 4 (1997): 555-589.  
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spectrum started appealing to liberal norms and opposed the existing conservative 
policy framework. This triggered a normative conflict between actors who pushed for 
the liberalization of refugee policies and actors who continued to argue for restricting 
refugee numbers and prioritizing citizens. The government’s initial liberal approach to 
the refugee crisis was motivated by fulfilling obligations under international law and 
applying European values and norms on human rights. 11  Furthermore, the coverage of 
the crisis and the depictions of refugees suffering led to a great mobilization of actors 
who identified Germany’s liberal values and leadership role as reasons to replace the 
conservative refugee framework with a liberal approach. A short and clear causal chain 
that enabled actors to connect Germany’s moral responsibility with the refugee crisis, 
reinforced the appropriateness of liberal refugee policies.   
 However, Germany’s reintroduction of conservative policies shortly after 
initiating unprecedented liberal measures in the first half of 2015 represents the second 
puzzle. It is a puzzle for constructivists because the factors which triggered the 
liberalization of policies still remained throughout the shift back to a restrictive agenda.  
A rationalist explanation might hypothesize that Germany realized the rising economic 
and security costs which triggered the return to traditional, restrictive policies. While 
this argument seems to be promising and straight forward, it fails to address the 
complexity of the decision making process, and how both logic of consequences and 
logic of appropriates played a role in the shift.12 The high refugee numbers certainly 
                                                          
11 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
12 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1-
36; Harald Muller, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and 
the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 10, 
no. 3 (2004): 395-495. 
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increased economic and security concerns amongst actors. However, actors perceived 
material factors differently depending on which norms they had internalized and 
prioritized. While this does not suggest that they did not also recognize alternative 
norms and attribute validity to contradicting norms, actors used different normative 
arguments in order to advance their preferred policy framework. Liberal actors pushed 
for the continuation of the liberal policy agenda by stressing that material consequences 
could be alleviated through successful refugee integration, and that the expansion of 
refugee protection is the most appropriate policy response. Conservative actors, on the 
other hand, utilized different sets of norms such as Germany’s responsibility to its own 
citizens and argued that a return to restrictive policies would limit material and 
reputational costs and represent a more appropriate policy reaction. European and 
domestic actors also criticized Germany’s unilateral approach and claimed that it 
violated procedural rules and the democratic decision making process. Furthermore, 
Germany’s departure from long-standing, conservative asylum practices irritated 
domestic and European actors and decreased overall solidarity.13 In the light of 
decreasing solidarity and increasing criticisms from national and regional actors, policy 
makers concluded that a shift back to more conservative policies would be both less 
costly and more appropriate. 
The dynamic development of German refugee policies illustrates the complexity 
of norm interaction. Actors appealed to different sets of norms and rules, which were 
located in the institutions of the international, the EU, and the German domestic system, 
in order to advance their preferred policy agenda. Domestic norms were reinforced 
                                                          
13Antje Wiener, “Enacting Meaning-in-use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations,” 
Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 175-193. 
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vertically when actors utilized similar norms on the regional and international level. In 
terms of horizontal interaction, norms and rules on the same level of analysis were often 
incompatible or inconsistent with regards to the behavior they required from actors. 
This created arguments amongst different actors about which norms should be 
embraced, how they should be interpreted, and what constitutes the appropriate policy 
response. While conservative actors argued that adhering to the long-standing, 
restrictive policy framework and protecting German citizens should remain the 
country’s main priority, liberal actors stressed the importance of expanding refugee 
protection and an open door policy. Ultimately, actors were motivated both by 
principled deliberation and also by strategic pursuit of goals in the ways that they 
interpreted and employed rules and norms.  
Significance 
 International migration, the movement of refugees in particular, will continue to 
pose a challenge to states and demand sustainable individual as well as collective 
action. The Syrian refugee crisis has been called the “worst humanitarian crisis of our 
time,” and state response to it will ultimately influence future practices.14 The policies 
initiated and upheld throughout the next few years might be detrimental to the evolution 
of universal norms and law with regards to refugees. Depending on how global actors 
respond, notions such as refugee status, the principle of non-refoulement, as well as the 
practice of migration control might change.15 With Germany as one of the most 
influential and leading actors in the refugee crisis, the country’s policy approach to 
                                                          
14 P.J. Tobia, "The Worst Humanitarian Crisis Since World War II," PBS, July 29, 2015, 1, accessed 
October 4, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-world-war-ii/. 
15Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU (New York: 
Routledge, 2006). 
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asylum and refuge will shape the European Union’s approach and will potentially serve 
as a model for non-European states.  
 More generally, the findings of this study illustrate how sets of norms interact 
and influence the policy making process. The incompleteness of rule systems leads to 
different interpretations of norms, which in turn triggers arguments about policy 
prescriptions. Therefore, decision makers encounter a variety of norms and rules as well 
as actors with diverging policy preferences. This reinforces our understanding that a 
norm on a particular issue area does not exist in a vacuum, but rather that the policy 
environment is shaped by vertical and horizontal norm interaction which modifies 
respective norms and rules and changes policy responses.   
 The regional asylum system figures centrally in Germany’s development of 
refugee policies. Existing research has treated norms beyond the domestic level as 
international, often without distinguishing between regional and global rule systems. 
However, as this case study shows, the European asylum system is distinct and highly 
influential in domestic policy making as it specifies broad international norms and turns 
them into binding legislation. Consequently, regional normative systems should be 
considered independently in their function of diffusing norms and shaping domestic 
policies.  
 Future IR scholarship should continue to explore how normative systems, in 
particular different sets of norms, interact in practice. Investigating decision making 
processes and policy responses will help researchers to expand on existing literature on 
norms and rules. This will also contribute to our understanding of how and why certain 
normative arguments trigger shifts in policies while others do not. Additionally, policy 
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makers consider a variety of factors before changing long-standing policies. Therefore, 
scholars should consider how both logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences 
shape the decision making process.  
Methodology 
 In order to understand Germany’s refugee policy making, including its initial 
liberal reaction and the shift towards a more restrictive approach, I conducted a series of 
semi-structured interviews over a period of three months with Congressional 
representatives of the German government, local politicians, migration scholars and 
experts, and civil society. During an internship in a Congressional Office in Berlin, I 
was able to experience the refugee policy making dynamics in meetings, briefings, and 
official hearings. While I did not interview refugees themselves, I volunteered in 
different refugee camps and spoke with volunteers and local politicians in order to gain 
a better understanding of the overall organization of services and, in particular, how and 
to which degree federal decisions have been perceived and implemented on the local 
level.  
Following the data collection process, I coded the interviews. I used discourse 
analysis in order to find similar patterns and to identify the main drivers for Germany’s 
refugee policies.16 Additionally, I analyzed hearing protocols, reports by civil society 
and the opposition, as well as scholarly articles on the development of European 
migration control and securitization. In order to gain an understanding of Germany and 
                                                          
16 Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling 
Discourse (Boston: MIT Press, 2008); Anna Holzscheiter, "Between Communicative Interaction and 
Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations, "International 
Studies Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2013): 142-162; Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in 
International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," European Journal of International 
Relations 5, no. 2 (1999): 225-254; Muller, "Arguing, Bargaining,” 395-495; Antje Wiener, “Enacting 
Meaning-in-use,” 175-193. 
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Europe’s legal obligations with regards to refugee protection, I reviewed international 
refugee, human rights, and European law. 
I contacted the interviewed participants personally in meetings or via email and 
informed them about the scope and goal of my research. A total of 20 participants 
volunteered to be interviewed for an average of 20 to 40 minutes. Interviews aimed at 
identifying the main drivers for the (1) initial liberal refugee response and the (2) 
following shift towards more restrictive policies. In order to gain a general 
understanding of the interviewees’ perception of the refugee crisis policy making, each 
individual was asked to describe the overall policy development and Germany’s 
reaction. Follow-up questions investigated why the German government initiated such 
liberal policies, why there seems to be a shift towards less liberal policies, and the 
consequences associated with both liberal and conservative policies. Participants were 
also asked to describe their preferred policies, and what future policies they anticipate 
for Germany and Europe. All interviews were recorded with digital audio and 
transcribed for further analysis.   
Interviewees are from a diverse demographic background and represent a broad 
spectrum of political and personal perspectives and affiliations. In order to maintain the 
participants’ anonymity and privacy, no identifying information was collected or 
recorded. However, Table 1 provides a general overview of the interviewees’ profiles. 
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Table 1.  Interview profiles  
 
Chapter Overview 
The first chapter will provide the theoretical framework on norm interaction and 
regime theory. I first explore the empirical background of Germany’s policy making 
before explaining the puzzles and connecting such to relevant international relations 
(IR) theory. In the second chapter, I address Germany’s initial liberal reaction to the 
refugee crisis and offer an analysis of how liberal norms were activated and utilized by 
actors in order to push for the open door agenda. I discuss the shift from this liberal 
approach to more traditional, restrictive policies in the third chapter. I will consider how 
normative conflict produced arguments amongst different actors, and how both logic of 
appropriateness and logic of consequences figured centrally in the policy shift.  Finally, 
the conclusion will summarize the argument and the findings as well as revisit the 
significance of the study and the implications for IR theory and the future policy course.
Congressional 
Politicians 
Local 
Politician
s 
Civil Society/Volunteers Migration Experts 
Party Affiliation Organization Institution 
CDU/CSU 3 2 Amnesty International 1 
Akkon University 
of Human 
Sciences 
1 
SPD 3 2 Caritas 1 
University of 
Nuremburg 
1 
Die Linke 1 N/A Red Cross 1 
Criminal 
Investigation 
Department 
1 
Die Grünen 1 N/A ProAsyl 1 
Osnabrueck 
University 
1 
Sex 
Female 4 1  3  1 
Male 4 3  1  3 
Total Participants=20 
 8 4  4  4 
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Chapter 1: The Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 Germany’s approach to the refugee crisis - the country’s initial open door policy 
followed by the return to more conservative measures - illustrates the complexity of 
normative systems.17 Throughout the crisis, actors appealed to different norms in order 
to promote their policy preferences. Whereas conservative actors stressed the 
importance of adhering to long-standing, restrictive procedures, liberal actors urged to 
expand and strengthen pro-refugee policies. This created tensions between different sets 
of norms and triggered arguments about the appropriate policy reaction.  
 Germany responded to the refugee crisis with an unprecedented open-door 
agenda. For decades, the country had consistently stressed adherence to European 
asylum mechanisms and the right of member states to individually control immigration 
policies. However, with the escalating humanitarian crisis in the Middle East and 
increasing numbers of people fleeing from persecution, Germany changed its 
conservative approach and initiated a number of liberal policies. The country suspended 
the Dublin Regulation18 in spring 2015, and announced in August that it would not 
return any Syrian refugees. Germany also mobilized a variety of resources for 
accommodating refugees in an effort to provide holistic access to asylum and 
protection. For rationalists, Germany’s decision to liberalize its traditional, conservative 
                                                          
17 Parts of this chapter are forthcoming in the publication “Compromising Refugeehood: Access to 
Asylum and Non-Refoulement in the European Union. Discrepancies between International and European 
Refugee and Human Rights Law” in the University of Oklahoma’s Journal of Global Affairs, Volume VI, 
2017.    
18 The Dublin system requires that the asylum status of migrants must be determined in the first European 
country of arrival. It allows countries to return asylum seekers to the respective first country of arrival. 
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stance on asylum and refugee procedures presents a puzzle. Rationalist scholars expect 
states to behave in a self-interested, utility maximizing manner; however, the shift to 
liberal policies was costly and reversed long-standing conservative policies.19 It is 
possible that economic benefits could be gained from the policy shift as a result of the 
influx of skilled workers, long-term contributions to the social security system, and 
balancing decreasing birth rates. Yet, such arguments fail to explain why the German 
government did not create a more sustainable migration system earlier to attract regular 
migrants. Additionally, the German government was well aware that the intake of 
refugees constitutes a short and long-term economic risk, as costs might outweigh the 
benefits.20 Hence, constructivist scholarship is better equipped to account for the change 
in policy as it provides tools to analyze the normative conflict evident in the empirical 
data. The research question is why liberal norms were activated in this particular 
situation and not before, and why were they more successful than preexisting 
conservative norms? An investigation of the interaction between domestic, regional, and 
international norms suggests that similar norms complement and strengthen one another 
and give actors more chances to promote preferred norms.  Actors were able to 
advocate for a liberal response because of the severity of the humanitarian crisis. They 
stressed Germany’s moral obligations to help, and framed the introduction of liberal 
policies as the most appropriate behavior regardless of economic consequences.  
                                                          
19 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984); Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979).  
20 Reports confirm that the German government knew the estimated costs of accommodating refugees. In 
interviews, Congressional Representatives stressed that they were aware of the economic costs and that 
economic benefits were peripheral in the decision making process.  
 14 
 However, shortly after the introduction of liberal refugee policies, the German 
government reversed its open door agenda and reinstated more conservative measures. 
The country passed laws to deport and repatriate failed asylum seekers to safe countries 
of origin or safe third countries, and reestablished border controls. Additionally, rights 
of refugees and access to services were increasingly linked to obligations and subject to 
cuts. On the European level, talks about a fairer, human rights oriented asylum system 
and refugee resettlement were replaced by discourse on securing Europe from irregular 
migrants and terrorists.21 From a rationalist standpoint this presents a straightforward 
story of Germany reversing a costly liberal policy course. Domestic and European 
systemic failure overburdened Germany and other member states, and led to the policy 
shift back to traditional, conservative policies. While this surely is part of the 
explanation, it does not account for the complexity of the underlying motivations of the 
policy shift. The rationalist explanation is helpful but incomplete as it overlooks the role 
of norm interaction and contestation that can be identified in the case study. From a 
constructivist perspective, it is puzzling why liberal refugee norms were successfully 
challenged shortly after their introduction, leading to a return to more conservative 
policies. The empirics suggest that decision makers not only encountered norms that 
compete vertically but also horizontally, making the decision process even more 
complex. This further illustrates the interaction of simultaneously valid but potentially 
incompatible norms at various levels of analysis. The tensions between different sets of 
norms account for the development and change of normative systems, and shapes 
                                                          
21 Jean-Claude Juncker, "State of the Union 2016: Towards a better Europe - a Europe that protects, 
empowers and defends," (speech, Strasbourg, September 14, 2016), European Commission, 1-9. 
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subsequent policy outcomes.22 Additionally, the findings illustrate that material factors 
alone did not trigger the policy shift. Rather, the combination of both logics of 
consequences and logics of appropriateness provide a more sophisticated explanation. 
By unilaterally initiating liberal policies, Germany challenged long-standing domestic 
and European asylum norms and practices, undermining actors’ ontological security and 
their understanding of procedurally legitimate behavior. Conservative actors framed the 
continuation of liberal refugee policies as costly and inappropriate and argued that a 
return to restrictive measures aligns with the preexisting normative order.     
 In the following paragraphs, I will review the theoretical framework for 
Germany’s refugee policy making. In the first section, I introduce regime theory and 
discuss the dynamics within and between the relevant European regimes. The second 
part of this chapter investigates Germany’s unprecedented pro-refugee approach in 
order to show how liberal norms were activated and accumulated enough moral 
pressure so that the government revised traditional, conservative policies. This will be 
followed by the third section, which focuses on the policy reversal as a result of the 
normative conflict between different sets of rules on the domestic, regional, and 
international level. Finally, I will identify existing gaps in the IR literature, and show 
how this study and its findings expand current IR scholarship with regards to global 
governance and international organization literature.   
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Wayne Sandholtz, "Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder, 
"European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1 (March 2008): 103.  
 16 
Regime Theory 
What is a Regime?  
 The study of international regimes has been a focal point in international 
relations for four decades now.23 Krasner defines regimes as “implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”24 Scholars of different 
schools of thought disagree on the origins of regimes and their impact. While realists 
argue that regimes only obscure power relations, institutionalists recognize their 
importance as a means of maximizing benefits.25 Constructivists stress that consistent 
patterned behavior creates intersubjective expectations, shapes state identity, and results 
in the creation of regimes.26 Regimes are therefore more than just products of state 
interest. They are quite robust and not easily reformed.27 The normative element added 
by constructivist research has offered insightful analyses of international regimes that 
go beyond the rationalist account. It has opened up a discussion on how not only states 
construct and use regimes, but also how regimes influence state interest and behavior. 
Furthermore, non-state actors have been included in the debate as agents overseeing and 
carrying out functions of the regime. Many regimes have such governing organizations, 
                                                          
23 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes, "International 
Organization 41, no. 03 (1987): 491-517. 
24 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
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27 Young, "Regime Dynamics," 279. 
 17 
and regimes typically consist of both formal and informal arrangements.28 As social 
systems, regimes are platforms for negotiation and bargaining, which commonly results 
in disagreement and non-compliance. However, this does not serve as a proof of 
instability but rather that social practices and expectations are resistant to change.29  
How do Regimes Evolve?  
 Much literature on regimes has focused on how actors create and change 
regimes. Institutionalists suggest that states purposefully seek informal and formal 
agreements in order to diminish transaction costs. These scholars argue that state 
interests could not have been achieved without the regime, or that benefits gained from 
the regime outweigh the costs.30 Institutions represent a rational response by states to 
address and resolve problems, making regimes no more than deliberately planned and 
controlled outcomes of state negotiations.31 States certainly play a key role in the 
creation of regimes; however, it is arguable whether or not the actors who created a 
regime remain in control at all times. Many regimes are intrusive and limit state power 
or establish certain, often times costly, obligations.32 As institutions develop, they often 
“produce undesirable and even self-defeating outcomes,” while remaining intact.33 It is 
therefore important to recognize that influence is not only exhibited from the “bottom 
up,” but also from the “top down.” Additionally, regimes are not always explicitly 
planned and coordinated amongst actors. They might emerge as a result of existing, 
                                                          
28 Young, "Regime Dynamics," 277. 
29 Ibid., 279-280. 
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31 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International 
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informal understandings of appropriate behavior. Patterned state interactions create 
expectations, which then may lead to formal agreements and ultimately to a regime.34 
An analysis of norm emergence is essential for understanding how convergent behavior 
and expectations mature into a regime.  
 Finnemore and Sikkink have developed a model that allows scholars to 
conceptualize norms and their life cycles.35 In the first stage, norm entrepreneurs try to 
persuade decision makers to adopt and internalize certain norms. In order to establish a 
norm’s legitimacy, entrepreneurs often engage in framing and use organizational 
platforms.36 In the second stage, the norm is institutionalized on the international level 
and is increasingly accepted amongst states. The final stage indicates the norm’s 
internalization. At this point, the norm is legitimate and expected to be followed. 
Therefore, as national norms become internationally diffused, they socialize actors and 
create mutual expectations and perceptions of appropriate behavior. It is important to 
note that not all norms result in regimes. Nevertheless, antecedent norms guide state 
behavior, shape expectations and interests and are therefore important drivers in the 
regime creation process. Once a regime is created, it governs state behavior in a specific 
issue area. As states face a multitude of challenges due to the increasingly 
interconnected nature of the international system, more and more regimes have emerged 
over the last few decades. While this institutionalization is beneficial to state and non-
state actors, it has also complicated regime governance.   
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 Although early models of norm emergence and diffusion are of foundational 
importance to IR scholarship, they only provide a simplistic, often times linear or 
cyclical view of how a singular norm spreads. The most commonly overlooked factors 
in normative research are (1) the existence of multiple rule systems on any given subject 
area and their complex vertical and horizontal interaction and (2) the importance of 
regional regimes as a barrier or catalyzer for norm diffusion. In reality, multiple norms 
and rules on the same subject interact simultaneously, resulting in the contestation of 
meanings, which in turn complicates the decision making process and policy 
implementation.37 The different interpretation of norms is especially visible when 
international norms are translated into domestic ones. Norms are subject to 
“localization,” referring to the process of adjusting international norms in order to 
integrate them into domestic normative system.38 Regional norms have not often been 
an explicit object of study as existing scholarship mainly focused on international to 
national and vice versa norm diffusion. This homogenizes different sets of norms and 
rules and underestimates the independent role of regional rule systems. However, the 
regional level functions as a filter or catalyzer when norms spread from the bottom up 
or top down. Many regional systems of norms are well developed, and their provisions 
figure centrally in domestic policy making. The lack of theoretical treatment of the 
regional level has created a void for a more sophisticated model of norm interaction and 
has homogenized different sets of norms.  
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 A better understanding of the complexity of rule systems would allow for a 
more advanced categorization of actors in their capacity as individual norm 
entrepreneurs or collective social movements.39 Actors need to build congruence 
between transnational and local norms by framing norms in accordance with both 
domestic as well as regional, preexisting beliefs and expectations.40 This is a highly 
complicated process as domestic and regional normative systems might differ from one 
other. Furthermore, with the multitude of actors engaged in policy debates, all of whom 
have been socialized differently, policy preferences are not only heterogeneous across 
camps, but might also differ within specific camps. Diverging interpretations of what 
constitutes appropriate behavior, given the different sets of rules, are not uncommon.41 
Therefore, actors need to persuade their audiences that following a particular set of 
norms falls in line with the longstanding, normative system. The existence of multiple 
rule systems in any given society and the subsequent vertical as well as horizontal 
interaction of overlapping norms complicates the policy making process and will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
Regime Complexes  
Throughout the 20th century, most regimes were somewhat isolated and held a 
monopoly over one particular issue area. However, globalization has led to a rapid 
“institutional proliferation.”42 Hence, many regimes overlap with one another, have 
authority over the same or similar issues, and may complement or contradict one 
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another.43 Raustiala and Victor define a regime complex as “an array of partially 
overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area.”44 A 
complex arises as a result of “legal inconsistencies,” referring to the lack of cross-
regime norm and rule coordination.45 Their focus on the legal element highlights the 
non-agentic authority of regimes and shows that competing laws and rules drive actor 
interpretation and behavior. Therefore, to qualify as a regime complex, institutions must 
not only overlap but norms and principles must also be somewhat divergent. Orsini, 
Morin and Young include the contradictory nature of a regime complex in their 
definition and specify it as “a network of three or more international regimes that relate 
to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, 
normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or 
not they are managed effectively.”46 This extends the traditional definition and helps to 
better conceptualize a regime complex. Existing and evolving regime complexes 
present an obstacle for actors involved in a particular regime. Interests and values of 
both state and non-state actors may be compromised as one regime shares authority 
over an issue with a contradictory regime. As Betts points out, international 
organizations within the regimes face the task of adjusting to the changing 
environment.47 In order to ensure the norms of one regime and counter those of a 
contradictory regime, organizations have started to expand their scope and purpose.  
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As a result of overlapping regimes, state and non-state actors have also started to 
engage in forum shopping48 and regime shifting.49 Forum shopping refers to actors 
choosing “international venues based on where they are best able to promote specific 
policy preferences.”50 Regime shifting occurs when states “move from addressing 
problems through one regime to addressing those problems through an alternative 
regime.”51 Such behavior has reinforced regime complexes and complicated policy 
making. In order to develop mutually agreeable procedures, negotiators often need to 
compromise and adopt broad rules that leave enough room for interpretation. On the 
other hand, regime complexes balance power structures and counter regime monopolies. 
They furthermore enable a variety of actors to partake in the negotiation process. 
Overall, regime complexes complicate policy making in the respective issue areas.  
Relating the literature on regime complexes to Sandholtz’s conception of rule 
systems, we observe that the increasing density of regime complexes leads to more 
complex rule systems. Increasingly complex rule systems create more ambiguity and 
situations in which actors will wind up with differing interpretations of what kinds of 
behavior and policies are appropriate. The horizontal and vertical interaction of 
different sets of norms will be illustrated more clearly in the case of the European 
refugee regime complex.  
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The Refugee Regime Complex  
 The international refugee regime was created shortly after the Second World 
War. It consists of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention) and the 1967 Protocol that eliminates temporal and geographic limitations. 
The organization that governs and oversees the implementation of the provisions is the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While the refugee regime 
remains the most “developed and coherent aspect of global migration governance,” a 
number of parallel regimes have evolved.52 As such not only overlap, have authority 
over similar issues and either reinforce or weaken one another, we may speak of a 
refugee regime complex. The human rights regime ensures universal protection and 
basic rights for vulnerable individuals that go beyond the refugee regime. Other regimes 
such as the development regime or the humanitarian regime focus on preventing the 
root causes of forced migration and provide services for internally displaced persons.53 
The interactions between these regimes are mostly complementary. However, the most 
problematic alternative regime that addresses areas related to migration and asylum is 
the travel regime. While there is no formal international travel regime, countries have 
created a transnational network of implicit and explicit arrangements and agreements to 
collectively manage the flow of migrants.54 Strict visa requirements, international transit 
zones, excessive security checks, and border control are some of the negotiated 
measures.55 This has negatively impacted access to asylum and refugee protection. 
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Regime complexes are not necessarily purely international, as many states have 
developed their own refugee regime complex with differing norms, principles, 
procedures, and rules. Therefore, it is helpful to recognize that the global refugee 
regime complex consists of multiple individual regimes at the regional and national 
levels.56 Analyzing region-specific refugee regime complexes adds an additional layer 
of specificity to the ongoing IR debate and is essential to understanding policy making 
processes. The European refugee regime complex is a prime example of the dynamic 
interactions between state and non-state actors.  
  Just as other refugee regime complexes, the European one includes a multitude 
of regimes such as the labor, human rights, humanitarian, development, security, and 
the travel regime which all intersect with the refugee regime.57 As aforementioned, the 
junctures of the travel-refugee regime are most problematic in this regard, and I will 
therefore focus on such. The European refugee regime is directly connected to and 
reflects the core principles of the international refugee regime. However, the European 
Union (EU) has developed specific rules and procedures to accommodate asylum 
seekers’ needs and ensure higher standards of protection. The two core instruments of 
the European refugee regime are the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
(ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). With 
regards to refugee law, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights not only 
refers to a general prohibition of torture, degrading or inhuman treatment and 
punishment, but also includes non-refoulement to areas where such might occur.58 The 
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CFR, which is based upon the ECHR, also addresses refugee issues. Article 4 condemns 
any form of ill-treatment, Article 18 ensures the right to asylum, and Article 19 
prohibits the return to a country where there is a risk of the inhuman or degrading 
treatment, punishment, torture, or the death penalty.59 The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are the main 
legal bodies that ensure member states’ adherence to international and European 
standards of refugee protection. The CJEU is responsible for correct interpretation and 
application of the CFR.60 National courts might request a preliminary ruling with 
regards to questions on asylum.61 Furthermore, the court holds institutions as well as 
member states accountable for violations of EU law. When it comes to protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as laid out in the European Convention, the 
ECtHR is the main legal body to judge state violations. In addition to the European 
legal system, a number of NGOs, IGOs and private actors provide services to asylum 
seekers and potential refugees. In general, the European refugee regime is well 
developed and equipped to ensure quality protection. In an effort to balance the 
pervasive nature of the international and European refugee regime as well as to manage 
the increased numbers of migrants arriving in Europe throughout the 70s and 80s, 
European members started to expand an alternative regime: the travel regime.62  
 While the overall travel regime has existed for thousands of years, regional 
travel regimes have only recently become institutionalized in an effort to regulate 
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human mobility more efficiently. In this context, the beginnings of the European travel 
regime can be traced back to the Schengen Agreement of 1985. With its implementation 
five years later, the EU realized the abolition of internal and application of external 
border controls. This introduced the Schengen visa regime with a “four-tier access 
control model”63 that includes migration control and surveillance within and outside the 
union as well as faster deportation and expulsion mechanisms.64 The EU requires visas 
from individuals coming from “all countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia as well 
as a number of countries in Eastern Europe, Central America and the Pacific Rim.”65 
People with a visa requirement are subject to additional background checks and might 
be denied entry at any time. Embassies and consulates are encouraged to place 
individuals into “special risk categories” such as “the unemployed, persons without 
regular income, etc.”66 The visa system represents a central part of the travel regime. It 
has restricted individuals’ access to protection, as most asylum seekers originate from 
countries with visa requirements or fall into one of the risk groups. 
 Additionally, the EU has created the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) in order to harmonize asylum procedures and to ensure the same treatment in 
every member state. It consists of the Dublin regulation and numerous directives, which 
are all binding to members.67 The Dublin system is essential in this regard as it 
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determines which state is responsible for an asylum application. The system foresees 
that asylum claims are to be lodged and evaluated in the first European country of 
arrival. Refugees who do not follow the Dublin provisions may be returned to the initial 
country that is responsible for their asylum application. This does not only entail 
expulsion to a different European country, but might include removal to another ‘safe’ 
third country. While the CEAS appears to be a promising measure of the refugee regime 
rather than the travel regime, the homogenization of asylum throughout Europe has 
compromised the overall quality of refugee protection. The CEAS only sets minimum 
standards for refugee protection, which has encouraged member states to adjust, and 
often times reduce, their national standards.68 The Dublin Regulation not only fails to 
distribute responsibility fairly amongst member states, but also impedes individuals’ 
rights to free movement and to seek asylum in their desired country.69 Additionally, the 
EU has engaged in outsourcing and offshoring migration control and protection. 
Offshoring refers to externalizing a state’s own migration authorities and outsourcing 
includes transferring migration responsibilities to private actors or third states.70 The EU 
has entered into agreements with various other countries and diffused migration and 
protection duties to authorities of respective states. The deployment of immigration 
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liaison officers (ILOs) plays a central part in this practice. While ILOs supposedly only 
assist but not influence third country authorities, they often exercise direct control.71  
Furthermore, the EU increasingly delegates migration control and protection to 
private actors. Carrier sanctions against airlines and other transport companies are 
common.72 The EU’s restrictive travel regime has created a lucrative private security 
industry, including a large number of companies hiring security personnel and border 
guards carrying out deportation and control services. It has strengthened the roles of 
Frontex and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as entities to manage 
irregular migration. Their scope and purpose was expanded, and they now exercise 
much more authority in carrying out border control measures and sea rescue missions. 
The various restrictive policies have created norms, principles, and rules restricting 
asylum and immigration. Consequently, the travel regime has reduced rather than 
enabled refugee protection and encouraged states to shift regimes.73  
 By addressing asylum and immigration through the travel regime, states have 
obscured their responsibility to refugee protection and “bypass[ed] without overtly 
violating” the refugee regime.74 Therefore, the European refugee-travel regime complex 
has benefited member states and non-state actors concerned with migration control and 
challenged human rights and refugee protection non-state actors as well as the European 
legal system. Nevertheless, the tensions between the two regimes continue, provoking 
disputes over the appropriate policy response to migrant and refugee flows.    
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 With the beginning of the refugee crisis and during the first half of 2015, the 
international and European refugee regimes were more dominant than the travel regime. 
Instead of limiting access to asylum and returning irregular migrants, the EU voiced 
support and acknowledged their responsibility to protect. Germany took on the main 
leadership in the pro-refugee campaign and even suspended the Dublin Regulation, the 
centerpiece of the European asylum system and the travel regime. Besides pushing 
European liberal measures, the country initiated a number of unprecedented national 
policies in order to ensure access to asylum and protection. However, during the second 
half of 2015, European members, foremost Germany, refocused their attention towards 
the travel regime. On the EU level, a number of new conservative measures have been 
discussed and passed including an even stricter border management system and 
additional agreements to repatriate failed asylum seekers to countries such as 
Afghanistan and Sudan. Germany also turned its back to the refugee regime and 
reversed its liberal policy course.  
Having discussed international regimes and the European refugee regime 
complex, the two core questions remain: (1) Why was the refugee regime so 
pronounced in the beginning, and what motivated Germany to shift from its long-
standing, restrictive immigration and asylum policies towards unprecedented liberal 
policies, and (2) why has the travel regime regained dominance, and what made 
Germany reverse its liberal policy course?  
The Initiation of Liberal Refugee Policies 
 The discussion of the international and regional refugee and travel regimes 
provides the foundation for understanding the complexity of European as well as 
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German refugee policy making. It is apparent that decision makers face a dilemma: 
competing international and regional norms. If that was not enough, states also 
encounter a variety of domestic norms. These various domestic rule sets not only 
compete with and complement one another but also intersect with regional and 
international norms. Interaction amongst norms is therefore both vertical and horizontal 
(see Figure 1.1. for a visualization of norm interaction and Table 1.1. for a description 
of the various norms). In my efforts to explain Germany’s break with its long-standing 
restrictive immigration and refugee policies and shift towards a liberal approach, I will 
illustrate how various norms were activated and seen as the most appropriate behavior.  
 
Figure 1.1. Vertical and horizontal interaction of liberal and conservative refugee norms 
in Europe  
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 Table 1.1.  Mechanisms of liberal and conservative refugee norms in Europe  
 
Both liberal and conservative immigration and refugee norms have been 
competing on the regional and national levels. While the travel regime has been strong, 
and Germany has had a long history of restrictive refugee and immigration policies, 
liberal norms became more influential at the beginning of the refugee crisis. In this 
regard, norm empowerment has played an important role. Decision makers and societal 
actors have changed discourse and behavior in order to promote liberal refugee norms 
and policies.75 Finnemore and Sikkink note that state and non-state actors look for new 
ideas or norms or attempt to strengthen existing alternative ones in an effort to remedy 
specific emergency situations, conflict, or crises.76 The humanitarian crisis in the 
Middle East and the respective mass influx of refugees into Europe constitute such a 
situation. Consequently, both political and societal actors started supporting pro-refugee 
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 Liberal Conservative 
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norms. The majority of the government, civil society organizations, media as well as 
citizens pushed for more liberal policies.77  
For existing liberal norms to be empowered and activated, the domestic 
environment and the salience of the norm are important. This means that societal 
pressure from national and transnational non-state actors is not only present, but it is 
also able to influence the policy debate and course. In Germany, a variety of actors, 
especially civil society, NGOs, IGOs played an active role in the drafting of the new, 
liberal approach. Additionally, the norm needs to be salient. In this case, liberal refugee 
norms are salient as they not only exist on one level, but on the national, regional, and 
international level. They are institutionalized in international and regional treaties as 
well as incorporated in Germany’s domestic legal system. Hence, national, regional, 
and international refugee norms reinforced and strengthened one another. Both state and 
non-state actors highlighted the importance of refugee protection and state 
responsibility. While in the past, agentic pressure was not as pronounced and therefore 
prevented liberal norms from being activated, the severity of the recent refugee crisis 
triggered a much stronger reaction from national and international actors demanding a 
liberal response.  
 Furthermore, state identity is driven by values and norms.78 The above-
mentioned normative dynamics revealed Germany’s self-understanding as a 
“responsible and progressive state.”79 In this regard, states reflect on their values and 
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principles and acknowledge state responsibility and moral obligations beyond their 
territory as a result of an increasingly interconnected world.80 Other international actors 
as well as citizens expect states with a progressive identity to act in a particular way. 
Therefore, identity is closely connected to a state’s reputation. Failing to behave in 
accordance with one’s expected identity might be costly both at the domestic and 
international levels, as it threatens state legitimacy and authority. This perspective 
suggests that self-interest is the result of actors’ calculations of expected outcomes.81 
Policy decisions are therefore strategic and driven by the desire to maximize benefits.82 
However, even more important was the logic of appropriateness in regards to 
Germany’s policy reaction. As discussed earlier, the moral pressure applied by a variety 
of actors who appealed to liberal refugee norms reinforced the German government’s 
perception that, irrespective of the consequences, an open door policy is the most 
appropriate response. Therefore, the interaction of various norms and the respective 
pressure shapes national actors’ perception of costs as well as appropriate behavior, 
which in turn influences policy outcomes.83  
In the context of state identity, a brief discussion of legitimacy and authority is 
necessary to understand Germany’s shift to liberal policies. Legitimacy is described as a 
form of power, specifically a social power, constructed through norms, identity and 
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rhetoric.84 It is the “belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”85 
Not only norms and rules can be legitimate, but also physical entities such as 
organizations or states. Legitimacy gives state or non-state actors authority over defined 
geographic regions, issue areas, or in specific situations. Authority also includes having 
“expertise that is considered trustworthy.”86 This does not mean that authority is never 
questioned or contested, but rather that authority is legitimate to varying degrees, and 
that multiple forms of authority can exist simultaneously.87 As mentioned above, liberal 
norm pressure activated Germany’s moral responsibility. In a regional and international 
leadership role, the country perceived itself as legitimate authority to push for a shift 
towards liberal refugee policies throughout Europe. Germany assumed other member 
states to experience the pro-refugee normative pressure in a similar way and therefore 
expected them to follow and adhere to this particular interpretation of European values. 
A similar process occurred at the domestic level. Conformity amongst the majority of 
politicians, organizations, and the broader society consolidated the legitimacy of liberal 
refugee policies. 
 Though many international and regional actors as well as the broader domestic 
audience supported Germany’s liberal approach, the country’s unilateral decision was 
soon subject to harsh criticism. European and domestic actors appealed to traditional 
conservative norms and contested Germany’s regional and national agenda change. 
Consequently, Germany started reversing its liberal policy course mid-September 2015.  
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Reintroduction of Conservative Refugee Policies 
 In order to understand the complexity of the policy shift, it is necessary to 
review the interaction between different sets of rules. A consequentialist perspective 
would suggest that Germany’s shift back to a conservative approach is a straightforward 
story of a country correcting a costly policy decision. Economic and security factors 
certainly played a part; however, they alone are insufficient to account for the actual 
social process through which the return to restrictive policies was accomplished. Actors 
appealed to norms in order to frame their preferred policy options. This allowed 
conservative actors to portray the reintroduction of more restrictive policies as both less 
costly and more appropriate than continuing the liberal agenda. The interaction between 
various norms illustrates that German policy makers were faced with a dilemma. On 
one hand conservative domestic and regional norms regained a strong foothold because 
a variety of actors started to appeal to them. In the domestic arena, conservative parties, 
groups, local politicians, employers, and citizens increasingly contested the newly 
activated and embryonic liberal refugee policy framework. On the regional level, 
European leaders voiced their disapproval of Germany’s unilateral decision to suspend 
the Dublin system. They argued that Germany had violated the long-standing European 
asylum mechanisms and the well-established travel regime. On the other hand, national 
and transnational proponents of the refugee regime tried to counter the intensifying 
conservative norms.  
 Much IR literature has focused on competing norms either from top down, when 
international norms are contested in the domestic arena, or from bottom up, when new 
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domestic norms are uploaded to the international level.88 However, norm interaction is 
much more complex than existing literature suggests. In the German case, domestic, 
regional and international norms compete horizontally and vertically and reinforce one 
another vertically. This is apparent in discourse as various actors attempt to strengthen 
domestic norms by appealing or challenging regional or international norms and vice 
versa. Norm contestation is therefore not a hierarchical or sequential, but a fluid 
simultaneous process. Grouping domestic norms together and assuming that regional 
and international norms are similar enough to be homogenized obliterates norm 
dynamics and the dilemma decision makers face when choosing policy options.89  
 On the domestic level, liberal and conservative norms have been competing 
throughout the refugee crisis. This has given rise to normative conflicts and triggered 
arguments about the meaning of rules and appropriate behavior.90 Domestic as well as 
transnational actors have been important in the decision making process as such 
advocated their preferred norms by using national, regional, and international norms 
while trying to delegitimize undesirable norms.91 On the European level, leaders 
stressed the importance of adhering to the preexisting travel regime, reprimanded 
Germany’s turn away from it, and challenged the push towards liberal norms. The 
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international refugee regime was therefore not only competing with domestic 
conservative norms, but also with the distinct and well-established European travel 
regime. For this multi-layered process of contestation to work, actors appealed to 
specific norms and countered others in the pursuit of achieving a preferred policy 
course. While proponents of pro-refugee policies continued to stress Germany’s moral 
obligations, conservative actors highlighted the well-established, traditional policies.92 
However, why did conservative actors and discourse in favor of conservative refugee 
norms succeed over the newly activated liberal refugee policy course?  
 Conservative actors were able to portray longstanding, conservative refugee 
policies as both less costly and more appropriate than continuing the open door policies. 
Germany’s unilateral approach and the lack of communication intensified the material 
pressure for all actors involved. Besides increased costs, actors were also reluctant to 
accept and follow the liberal agenda because of long-standing conservative policies. 
Conservative actors were able to stress that the liberal response to the refugee crisis was 
neither consistent with preexisting norms and rules, nor did it reflect how previous 
crises were resolved.93 Therefore, a return to restrictive policies was portrayed as the 
most appropriate behavior. The existence of a long-standing conservative normative 
system with regard to asylum and refugee protection was decisive in the argumentation 
process of conservative actors. This necessitates a brief discussion on norm robustness 
and the type of norms.  
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The categorization of norms - whether or not a norm is robust and what kind of 
norm it is - has been a central part of constructivist research. Some scholars argue that a 
norm is more likely to be robust and less contested when specificity, durability and 
concordance are high.94 However, others stress that ambiguous norms and rules are 
easier achieved and implemented, and that even the most precise normative systems are 
incomplete and unable to cover every situation.95 Liberal refugee norms are broad and 
less precise. While they may be incorporated in treaties, laws, and debates, their lack of 
specificity has led to different interpretations and somewhat divergent practices. 
Therefore, the meaning attached to traditional liberal refugee norms differs from the 
respective meaning in use.96 This does not suggest that such norms are irrelevant; actors 
are reluctant to violate the provision of refugee protection. However, actors are able to 
challenge them more easily and evoke more robust norms as long as such do not 
blatantly violate refugee protection.97 Furthermore, the density of regimes in the case of 
migration and asylum has created multiple, permissible interpretations and policy 
prescriptions. Consequently, actors have been able to portray conservative policies as an 
equally appropriate response to the refugee crisis.    
Additionally, the travel regime and Germany’s conservative immigration 
policies have been well established. They represent specific, long-standing norms and 
practices, which are sticky and persist even when alternative norms have been activated. 
Conservative norms and rules have created a regional and domestic social structure with 
                                                          
94 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., "The Concept of Legalization," International Organization 54, no. 3 
(2000): 401-41; Legro, "Which Norms,” 34-35; Wiener, "Enacting Meaning-in-use,” 185. 
95 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance," International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421-456; Sandholtz, "Dynamics of," 105-106. 
96 Wiener, "Enacting Meaning-in-use,” 181-182. 
97 Sandholtz, "Dynamics of,” 101-131.  
 39 
shared expectations, obligations, and knowledge. Over time, adherence to the travel 
regime and national conservative policies has become the status quo.98 Actors rely on 
such habitual behavior and may be reluctant to accept change. Again, as rule systems 
allow for multiple interpretations, actors are able to use these existing rules that are 
endemic parts of social life in processes of interpretation and application.  
 In the case of Germany, domestic actors such as employers, local politicians 
and communities, conservative groups and parties were so used to traditional rules and 
practices that the implementation of the new liberal mechanisms was challenging and 
time-consuming. It was not the fact that policies were economically unbearable and 
costly or that such increased the security risk for the national population, but more so 
that actors interpreted sets of norms and rules differently and portrayed conservative 
agenda as an alternative, permissible policy prescription. As a result, social recognition 
for liberal policies steadily decreased. On the European level, Germany’s break with the 
travel regime and its unilateral decision to suspend the very core of the CEAS triggered 
both rebuke and rejection of liberal policies. As one of the main proponents of the 
European asylum mechanisms, Germany’s departure from the normative system 
surprised European leaders. In moving unilaterally, the country not only violated its EU 
partners’ understanding of appropriate procedural rules, but also disrupted the status 
quo. The lack of experience with liberal refugee practices and norms and reluctance to 
accept the policy shift, precluded Germany’s legitimacy and authority on the subject 
matter. Both domestic and regional opposition to change long-standing conservative 
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norms and practices and increasing pressure to renounce the newly introduced liberal 
approach, made Germany re-evaluate its policy decision.  
As discussed earlier, the decision making process was shaped by both logic of 
consequences and logic of appropriateness. Competing liberal and conservative norms 
placed the German government in a decision making dilemma. While pressure for the 
continuation of pro-refugee norms and policies remained high, the demand for reverting 
to the status quo rose simultaneously. Compared to the domestic, regional, and 
international refugee regime, the travel regime in combination with domestic 
conservative norms was, both in theory and practice, much more robust and well 
established. Germany’s departure from traditional norms and practices in refugee issues 
disrupted its national and European ontological security. The initiation of the liberal 
approach to the refugee crisis ran contrary to domestic and regional actor’s experiences 
and their “sense of continuity.”99 In the light of severe domestic and regional criticism, 
Germany’s reputation and leadership role was threatened. The country realized that its 
liberal policies were discordant with the expected behavior in the given social 
community. It lacked the legitimacy to convince other European governments to adopt 
liberal policies. Additionally, ignoring domestic and regional concerns would have been 
costly and strategically unwise. Consequently, the German government reevaluated its 
liberal policy agenda and found a return to restrictive policies as less costly and more 
appropriate.  
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Contributions to IR Literature 
 Much of the existing literature has focused on how international norms are 
internalized on the regional or domestic level, or how domestic norms become globally 
diffused and legitimate.100 In this context, scholars have attempted to understand norm 
contestation, specifically when international norms clash with domestic norms and vice 
versa.101 This has produced a quality rich theoretical debate that is backed up by much 
empirical evidence. Moreover, such has offered critical insights into the policy decision 
making process and added value to prevailing theories and explanations. However, 
empirical studies have predominantly investigated vertical interactions between norms. 
This somewhat homogenizes norms at each level of analysis and gives little attention to 
the distinct, individualistic character that norms acquire through the internalization and 
interpretation process. It furthermore ignores the existence of multiple norms and rules 
across the different levels of analysis, which are incomplete and internally 
inconsistent.102 It also undermines the complexity of the decision making process as it 
presumes that actors mainly encounter one specific norm that is competing vertically or 
is interpreted differently amongst actors. However, policy decisions are made under 
much more complex circumstances as norms have become less isolated and tend to 
overlap with one another. Besides vertical competition, norms also clash horizontally 
(different domestic norms with similar scope). This is important as it further illustrates 
that the state should not be treated as a unitary actor with a single defined interest. Some 
recent scholarship has addressed not only how various actors interpret a norm, but also 
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how they interpret and use norms that complement and compete with one another in 
scope and purpose.103 However, more needs to be done in this regard in order to expand 
the theoretical framework of norms. Acknowledging the differences within (horizontal) 
as well as between (vertical) domestic, regional and international norms, will help to 
better conceptualize norms in theory and explain the dynamics of policy making.   
In this chapter, I offered a detailed discussion of regime theory and the European 
refugee regime complex. As mentioned above, a large literature has investigated the 
relationship between international and domestic norms while underestimating regional 
norms and regimes. However, a regional regime may act as an important catalyst in the 
national decision making process. It is possible that a regional regime is stronger and 
more established than international or even some domestic norms and rules. The 
European travel regime serves as an example that not only long-standing national but 
also regional norms and practices influence and trigger policy changes.104 This is 
because they overlap and reinforce each other, while each maintains legitimacy in 
specific areas and proposes respective procedures and solutions. Therefore, domestic 
and regional norms may join together and compete with international, regional and 
domestic norms. Furthermore, regional regimes not only enable domestic and 
international actors to advance or contest norms, but also involve a variety of actors that 
are distinctively supranational. The European legal system for example has played an 
important role for both the international and regional refugee and travel regime. 
Consequently, future IR scholarship should factor in the effects of regional regimes on 
policy making and overall norm evolution.  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed the theoretical framework for Germany’s refugee 
policy course. Regime theory and the European refugee regime complex are central for 
understanding Germany’s initial liberal approach as well as the shift back to 
conservative policies. European states have many different interpretations of asylum 
and refugee norms, which have resulted in very distinct state-centered domestic norms 
and practices. With the continuous European integration, asylum and migration has 
been “uploaded” to the European level and created both conservative and liberal norms, 
laws, and policies. As asylum and migration have been more and more socialized on the 
European level, states have increasingly relied on European asylum norms and 
practices. Many distinct European norms and practices have developed, which were 
incorporated into domestic arenas (Dublin responsibility as an example).  Therefore, 
both European regional norms and domestic norms influence each other and are 
somewhat convergent, but also distinct and often address different policy areas (asylum 
services and procedures distinctly national, Dublin: European).  
Considering Germany’s initial liberal policy reaction, it appears that liberal 
domestic, regional, and international norms complemented and strengthened one 
another and gave actors more chances to promote preferred norms. As the refugee crisis 
was seen as a severe humanitarian crisis, actors stressed moral obligations and 
Germany’s identity as a progressive, liberal state. Deviant behavior would have been 
costly for the country’s reputation and contrary to its perceived identity in this specific 
situation. Germany’s decision to initiate a liberal agenda was therefore shaped by both 
logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness.  
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Germany’s reversal of its liberal policy course illustrates even more clearly the 
complexity of norm interaction and the dilemma decision makers face. As rule systems 
are incomplete and leave room for interpretation, actors are able to appeal to different 
norms in order to advance their preferred policy prescription. This leads to normative 
conflicts and triggers opposition, especially during crisis situations. In the German case, 
actors challenged alternative norms on the same or different levels of analysis. 
Conservative norms regained a strong foothold and were promoted by a variety of 
conservative actors. These actors used the existence of long-standing, restrictive 
migration and asylum norms and practices to counter the pro-refugee agenda. 
Germany’s deviant behavior violated long-standing domestic and European asylum 
norms, as well as shared understandings about legitimate rule-making procedures. 
Therefore, the continuation of liberal refugee policies, which had intensified material 
pressure on local communities and disrupted national and regional ontological security, 
was seen as costly and inappropriate. Conservative actors successfully framed the long-
standing restrictive normative framework as beneficial and appropriate, and convinced 
policy makers that a retreat toward more conservative policies was best suited to 
manage the refugee crisis. 
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Chapter 2: Germany’s Initial Liberal Policy Response  
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will discuss Germany’s unprecedented liberal reaction towards 
incoming refugees throughout 2015. While the country has had considerable amount of 
experience with regular and irregular migration flows, it had previously followed a 
rather restrictive immigration agenda. Germany’s past immigration policies and 
responses to mass migrant inflows prior to the 2015/16 refugee crisis focused on 
limiting the time that migrants as well as refugees were able to stay in the country 
framing them as “temporary guests” or “officially tolerated.”105 It was not until 2000 
that policy makers recognized Germany as a country of immigration and took first steps 
towards integration measures. With regards to the European migration and asylum 
system, Germany has been one of the main proponents of the CEAS and the Dublin 
Regulation, placing the burden on peripheral member states and restricting overall 
migration to Europe. Germany’s open door policy in 2015 was therefore surprising for 
many stakeholders and migration scholars. Some experts argue that the economic 
benefits gained from the refugee influx have been the main driver.106 As the country 
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faces an aging population and decreasing birth rates, it is in dire need of skilled labor to 
stabilize the social security system and to stay economically competitive. However, 
empirical evidence shows that while economic factors might have served as additional 
leverage to persuade sceptics, the main motives for liberal policies were based on 
humanitarian and moral norms.  
 An investigation of interview data, government documents, reports from civil 
society organizations, as well as media sources indicates that the German government 
regarded a liberal policy response to the refugee crisis as the most appropriate behavior 
due to the predominant human rights and refugee protection norms. A variety of pro-
refugee actors appealed to these norms and applied additional pressure to influence the 
country’s decision making process. The liberal norms and the subsequent agentic 
pressure and support were activated because of the particular emergency situation and 
the severity of the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East. The country’s identity as a 
progressive, multi-cultural society that embraces European values of freedom, justice, 
and human rights fit with the pro-refugee norms and policies. The internal and external 
pressure as well as the support from a variety of actors activated preexisting pro-refugee 
norms, which became more dominant than restrictive norms, ultimately triggering the 
initiation of unparalleled liberal policies.  
 This chapter will first offer a brief overview of Germany’s liberal policy 
response to the current refugee crisis that is distinct from past approaches to accepting 
and accommodating large numbers of migrants. I will then discuss the empirical study 
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and present the most dominant themes. In the last section, I illustrate the relationship 
between the various themes, and how they help explain the liberal policy response in 
2015.  
German Refugee Policy 
 In this section, I will first provide a brief overview of Germany’s past restrictive 
refugee policies before discussing the country’s most recent liberal response. As 
reviewing all of the German legislation on migration would be too extensive, I focus on 
asylum and refugee policies beginning in the 1980s up until the 2000s. In addition to 
formal policies and laws, I consider more informal measures and discourse. Though 
national and supranational initiatives are interconnected, I distinguish between them in 
order to highlight the liberalization process on different levels.  
Review of Past Restrictive Refugee Policies on the National Level 
 Throughout the 1980s, asylum applications in Germany increased considerably.  
The German government responded with the Asylum Procedure Code 
(Asylverfahrensgesetz) 1982, which aimed at restricting asylum appeals, limiting 
welfare services, and accelerating expulsions – all in an effort to deter potential asylum 
seekers.107 In addition, the Asylum Procedure Code established that the asylum claims 
of individuals who had previously stayed in a ‘safe third country’ should be denied.108 
Because Germany’s narrow interpretation of the right to asylum only included 
individual political persecution, a large number of refugees were excluded from asylum 
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in Germany.109 These restrictive policies were accompanied by negative public 
discourse on asylum and refugees. The mass influx of asylum seekers was commonly 
referred to as the ‘Asylanten Problem’ (asylum seeker problem), and politicians accused 
individuals of fraudulently claiming asylum and exploiting the German asylum system 
(Asylmissbrauch, abuse of asylum).110 In 1991, the Aliens Act was passed in order to 
expedite asylum procedures and to deport failed asylum seekers immediately.111 When 
violence against foreigners increased, the government further restricted access to 
asylum.112 Application numbers and expulsions decreased following an amendment to 
Article 16 of German Basic Law that strengthened the ‘safe third country’ concept and 
included a temporary rather than full refugee status. 113 In 1992, German policy makers 
introduced airport procedures that allowed detention in international zones of 
individuals without travel or visa documentation.114 German restrictive policies 
continued with the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act) of 
1993, which reduced benefits available to ‘tolerated persons’ to a bare minimum.115 The 
trend of restrictive policies continued throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, as most 
asylum seekers were granted temporary protection status (Duldung) or limited access to 
social services.  
 Germany experienced a paradigm shift in immigration policy with the new 
millennium. The government first recognized Germany as a country of immigration and 
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introduced a number of progressive policies such as the naturalization law, integration 
policies, and easier access for high skilled workers.116 Discourse also framed 
immigrants as a viable source for enhancing economic growth and multiculturalism. 
However, these measures mainly targeted an improvement in integration of immigrants 
already residing in Germany and did not include liberalizing overall access to asylum. 
No major legislation has been passed since 2005 to simplify access to asylum or 
encourage a more liberal approach. Public and political debates remained focused on 
criminalizing fraudulent asylum claims and restricting protection status.  
Review of Past Restrictive Refugee Policies on the Supranational Level  
 Throughout the 1980s, Germany advocated for Europeanizing migration and 
asylum policy in order to establish additional mechanisms to control and restrict 
irregular migration flows. With the introduction of Schengen and the abolishment of 
internal border checks, the EU agreed to better guard its external borders. This marked 
the “starting point for a joint policy of immigration control” and established rules for 
asylum and refugee procedures.117 The Dublin Convention of 1990 shifted the 
responsibility for protecting Europe’s external borders and examining asylum 
applications to peripheral member states. Regardless of criticism from southern 
European member states and international organizations, Germany insisted on the 
adherence to the Dublin principles. The country also pushed for more restrictive 
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measures with regards to the European asylum system by campaigning for the ‘safe 
third country’ notion and denying asylum claims from individuals who originated from 
or had previously stayed in such a country. When the talks about the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) began, Germany again fully supported the efforts to 
further harmonize migration and asylum policy. The Directives only established 
minimum protection standards and also included mechanisms for faster deportations, 
coercive measures, as well as (re-)entry bans.118 The CEAS is based on the principle of 
mutual recognition and therefore considers all European countries as having the same 
refugee standards. This has led to many instances of repatriations and deportations and 
compromised refugeehood. Nevertheless, Germany has consistently stressed the 
importance of the CEAS and Dublin and has been reluctant to change the system and 
adjust burden sharing. Additionally, the country has also concluded a number of 
bilateral agreements with neighboring countries to improve border controls in an effort 
to limit migrants reaching Germany as well as to repatriate third country nationals.119 
This restrictive policy approach was questioned throughout the refugee crisis, which 
began in 2014, as will be illustrated in the following section. 
Liberal Refugee Policies on the National Level  
For the first time in history, the German government actively prioritized (1) the 
expansion of refugee protection and (2) integration over repatriation and temporary 
protection measures. Prior to 2015, as discussed above, Article 16 of the Basic Law was 
interpreted in very narrow way, excluding a large number of asylum seekers. Most 
                                                          
118 Engler and Schneider, German Asylum. 
119  Bosswick, " Development of," 55. 
 51 
applicants were either denied asylum or only received subsidiary or temporary status.  
However, Angela Merkel expanded this definition and the individual right to asylum 
when she stated that any Syrian refugee in Germany qualifies for protection and would 
not be returned.120 With that, she suspended the requirement for refugees to prove 
individual persecution and simplified access to asylum to all individuals from war-torn 
countries. Overall asylum procedures were accelerated in order to guarantee full refugee 
status to the most vulnerable individuals.  
Angela Merkel also stated that asylum seekers and refugees “need[ed] our help 
so they can integrate quickly.”121 While there have been integration measures in the 
past, such by no means compare to Germany’s contemporary integration agenda. 
Within a few months, Germany created an unprecedented integration infrastructure of 
physical and social capital in order to facilitate refugee inclusion. Following Merkel’s 
lead, the government increased funding for communities to one billion Euros for 
2015122 and six billion for 2016.123 A national action plan was established in order to 
support communities and foster integration measures for refugees. In addition to the 
5.500 new government jobs in the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) 
and the federal police, new jobs were created in local job centers, migration and social 
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service agencies, as well as schools.124 Numerous local programs were established to 
provide language and job skills in order to speed up the integration process for asylum 
seekers.125  
Liberal Refugee Policies on the Supranational Level  
 The two liberal initiatives on the European level were the suspension of the 
Dublin system and the continued push towards a quota system. Germany has been one 
of the main proponents of the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation and stressed adherence 
to the system. However, the mass influx of refugees during spring and summer 2015 
caused Angela Merkel to announce that the country would voluntarily stop returning 
refugees, who had arrived in Germany, to the first European country of arrival. 
Germany’s welcoming message affected not only the country itself, but also 
undermined the provisions of the Dublin System, as many refugees were encouraged to 
travel towards Central Europe. The decision was supported by the UNHCR who had 
been critical of the Dublin Regulation,126 as well as by the European Commission, 
which “welcome[ed] this act of solidarity.”127  
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Going beyond the Dublin Regulation, the German government also stressed the 
need for more burden sharing. Hence, the country fully supported the refugee quota 
plan that aimed at distributing 120.000 refugees amongst EU member states.128 Merkel 
stressed that a fair resettlement system would avoid the problems of a few countries 
carrying the majority of the refugee burden.129 The German government was praised by 
peripheral countries such as Greece and Italy for taking such an unprecedented liberal 
approach and responsibility beyond European and international standards.  
 Overall, Germany initiated a number of national policies and supported 
supranational measures that illustrate a distinctly more liberal approach to the recent 
refugee influx. Past national policies focused on limiting refugee status and protection 
periods. With regards to European measures, Germany had been supportive of the 
CEAS and the Dublin Regulation limiting migrants’ and refugees’ access to central 
Europe. However, the new liberal policies reflected a paradigm shift. The German 
government devoted a large amount of resources for integration programs and 
suspended the Dublin Regulation indicating their readiness to welcome and accept 
refugees permanently.  
However, inviting refugees to Germany and introducing short and long term 
integration measures is a costly policy decision. It is therefore puzzling for rationalists 
as to why the German government would shift its longstanding focus from restrictive to 
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more liberal policies. Certainly, a rationalist explanation points towards long-term 
economic benefits gained from well-integrated refugees. As Germany’s workforce is 
aging and the country faces a labor shortage, experts suggest that refugees could 
alleviate the pressure on the social security system and contribute to economic 
growth.130 German politicians and employers have also acknowledged the potential 
benefits for the German and European economy.131 While these are valid arguments for 
increasing the number of refugees, it does not explain why the German government 
failed to introduce more migrant-friendly policies earlier to attract regular migrants. 
Therefore, a rationalist explanation is unable to account for the timing of the shift. 
Furthermore, the costs associated with taking in and accommodating large numbers of 
asylum seekers present an immediate economic burden. However, it is difficult to 
estimate the long-term costs of refugees and asylum seekers as most migration studies 
focus on the economic impacts of voluntary rather than forced migrants.132 As 
especially vulnerable individuals, refugees may need more assistance to adjust to the 
host country than voluntary migrants, placing an additional, unpredictable strain on 
public services. In Germany, the educational and professional level varies greatly 
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amongst the newly arrived refugees, and 70 percent do not have any sort of vocational 
training or formal job qualifications.133 Hence, the integration process will take at least 
a decade.134 Politicians and civil society agree that Germany’s open door policy is not 
only costly but potentially risky if integration fails. Germany will have to “invest 
tremendously” before it can even “think about reaping some benefits.”135 Others clearly 
stated that refugees are not the solution to Germany’s labor shortage and demographic 
challenge.136   
The overall interview data suggests that economic motivations played a 
peripheral role in the decision making process. One Congress Representative nicely 
summarized this by saying “considering the economic costs, this [liberal] policy 
shouldn’t have happened the way it did regardless of Germany’s strong economic 
position.” Furthermore, several civil society representatives also confirmed that “the 
government knew without a doubt about the economic consequences”137 but “[they] did 
it anyways.”138 This suggests that the German government did not simply behave in a 
consequentialist manner, but that logic of appropriateness significantly influenced the 
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shift towards more liberal policies. This is also supported by the findings of the 
empirical study which I will demonstrate below.   
Empirical Study: Motivations for Germany’s Liberal Refugee Policies 
 As already mentioned above, interview data provides detailed insights into the 
initial decision making and thought process of policy makers. I conducted 18 in-person 
and two telephone interviews with congress members, representatives of civil society 
organizations, migration and security experts, and local politicians. Congressional 
members of all parties currently holding seats in the German Bundestag were 
interviewed in order to collect representative data.139 Civil society representatives, 
migration and security experts had either been actively involved or had followed 
Germany’s refugee policy making and were therefore able to comment on the overall 
development of the country’s refugee agenda. Interviews with local politicians revealed 
how federal policies were perceived and implemented in communities.  
 In addition, government documents, media sources, and reports from civil 
society organizations further reaffirm the evidence from the interviews. A context 
analysis of the discourse suggests that Germany’s initiation of liberal policies was 
motivated by more than economic factors. It even appears that potential economic 
benefits were only mentioned in order to further strengthen already agreed upon liberal 
policies. The most prevalent themes of the discourse analysis can be grouped into the 
following four main categories: (1) values/norms, (2) responsibility, (3) 
pressure/support, and (4) leadership will be discussed in more detail below.  
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Values/Norms  
 Despite the variety of professions of interviewees, all study participants directly 
or indirectly mentioned German or European values and principles as decisive in the 
decision making process. They emphasized national or international law, sense of 
community, and values such as social justice, peace, empathy, and humanity. In 
Congressional debates, politicians stated that the right to asylum is so important that it 
is in fact nonnegotiable.140 Angela Merkel requested that the government “remember 
our fundamental values that are guided by Article 1 of our constitution: human dignity 
is inviolable”141 and refused a cap on refugees because article 16a of the German 
constitution does not have provisions.142 A Congressman indicated that “it is the 
thought of our constitution to provide unlimited protection to refugees,” and another 
one stated that “through our fundamental laws, we promise to help the most vulnerable 
individuals.”    
Besides national law, interview participants pointed towards the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. With regards to 
international treaties, a Congressman stressed that Germany has taken “an oath” to 
protect refugees and “this promise needed to be kept.”143 Angela Merkel indicated that a 
“decisive founding impulse of a united Europe would get lost, namely that of the close 
connection with universal human rights” if Germany and Europe could not find a 
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solution. Another politician referred to national and European refugee law as “a 
commandment […] to give a home to anybody who is fleeing war, persecution, or 
poverty.”144 Accepting refugees was not only a legal obligation or duty, but “simply the 
right thing to do.”145 In addition to political actors, civil society organizations also 
stressed the importance of European and international refugee law. The Carnegie 
Institute has called Merkel “a heroine for human rights groups and liberals across 
Europe for her policy toward the refugees.”146 The think tank, while praising German 
policies, stated that other European countries did not live up to the “promise […] in the 
1951 refugee convention” and “discarded [their] values” because they failed to “extend 
protection and basic human rights to the refugees.”147  
Additionally, all interviewees linked Germany’s liberal policy reaction to 
German and European values and sense of community. A Congresswoman stated that 
“humanity” came first and that the liberal policy course combined values such as 
“democracy, freedom, and peace.”148 Another Congressman pointed out that this crisis 
revitalized Germany’s “awareness of [liberal] values.”149 Connecting German policies 
with the EU, discourse was framed around the term Wertegemeinschaft (community of 
values). A Congressman mentioned that “we need to reconsider our sense of values if 
we want to solve this crisis.”150 He added that “the European project is based on liberal 
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values and human rights, ignoring such would be like destroying our foundation.”151 
Another Congressman from the CDU asked “what is Europe worth, if we don’t find a 
unified response to this crisis?”152 He continued stating that “[liberal policies] not only 
save refugees. They save us” as “we can prove our values.”153 This is particularly 
significant as actors across the political spectrum including conservative party members 
recognized and appealed to liberal norms.  
As illustrated above, many actors appealed to liberal refugee norms and rules in 
order to promote a pro-refugee agenda. However, other actors challenged this approach 
by stressing adherence to alternative, conservative norms and rules. Civil society 
representatives and migration experts identified a societal split throughout the refugee 
crisis. One interviewee indicated that “opinions on what constitutes the right policy 
response were mixed from the beginning.”154 Another one echoed the statement and 
added that “there were disagreements in Congress as well as amongst the broader 
society.”155  In regards to the political debate, especially members of the CDU/CSU, 
Merkel’s own party, were critical of liberalizing refugee policies. One CSU 
Congressman said that “abandoning [our] well-established refugee system in favor of [a 
new] approach is not the solution.”156 Another one indicated that “we should continue 
following the rules that we have in place. Instead of opening the borders, we should just 
adjust the existing policy framework.”157 A SPD Congressman confirmed this by stating 
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that “the chancellor’s approach to the refugee crisis was supported by us and the 
opposition, rather than by her own people in the party. Kind of disappointing.”158 
Conservative actors applied a much more narrow reading of international and regional 
law and stressed the country’s right to limit immigration. One Congresswoman said that 
“we are keeping our promise by protecting refugees under the existing [conservative] 
system. Those [refugees] who do not fall under the protection standards of the German 
and European system, must leave the country.”159 In a Congressional debate, one 
Congressional representative clearly summarized this stance: 
Refugee is […] a clearly defined term in international law, just as the right to 
asylum. The clear criterion is persecution, not economic hardship. That 
somebody comes to us because he does not see an economic or personal 
perspective in his home country, is of course no crime, but also no reason for 
asylum. I do not find this to be an inhuman or cynical attitude.160  
This exemplifies rule-guided behavior as even actors who opposed the liberal policy 
shift appealed to norms in order to articulate the appropriateness of continuing the 
conservative agenda.  
Ultimately, actors utilized both liberal and conservative norms and rules from 
the beginning of the refugee crisis. While a great majority promoted a much more 
liberal reading, other stakeholders continued to emphasize the traditional, conservative 
approach to asylum and migration.  
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Responsibility  
 The theme of responsibility is closely related to norms and values as 
responsibility implies that an actor is subject to a standard of appropriate behavior that 
guides his or her actions. However, while Germany might acknowledge the norm of 
refugee protection, actors disagree on what responsibility this includes and who is 
responsible to act. Therefore, this section introduces responsibility as a distinct theme 
from the above discussed norms and values in order to emphasize the diverging 
normative interpretations of responsibility.  
 When study participants were asked why the German government reacted in 
such a liberal way to the recent refugee crisis, “responsibility” was one of the most 
frequently used terms.161 Responsibility can be further categorized into (1) the reasons 
for Germany’s responsibility and (2) what kind of responsibility.  For the former, the 
data suggests that policy makers perceived a sense of responsibility because of 
Germany’s capabilities, history, and the severity of the crisis. In the case of the latter, 
individuals indicated that Germany should take responsibility by accepting more 
refugees into Germany, addressing the root causes of conflicts, and sharing the refugee 
burden fairly amongst global players.  
 Capabilities are repeatedly used as a reason for Germany’s responsibility in the 
refugee crisis. One Congressman stated that the country should take in more refugees 
because of its “comfortable economic situation.”162 As the “winner of European 
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politics,” Germany is seen to have sufficient fiscal and material resources to 
accommodate refugees.163 This meant that the country would also have to “take in more 
refugees than other countries in the future.”164 Some congressional representatives 
connected Germany’s capabilities with the global economy. One mentioned that 
Germany had profited from “exploiting poorer countries” and that the “unfair global 
economic order” had intensified human mobility.165 Yet another one voiced in a 
parliamentary hearing that “the European Union, Germany, and the USA carry 
responsibility and blame for escalating the misery [in the developing world]” and 
should therefore help.166 Amnesty International has also called onto economically 
leading countries to take on more responsibility.167   
 Besides capabilities, Germany’s history was mentioned as a reason for 
responsibility. In a parliamentary debate, one politician said that “the end of the 
[Second] World War marks the pacification from genocide and humanitarian 
catastrophe” and “from this history grows responsibility.”168 Another Congressman 
argued that “considering our history, […] we are responsible to treat refugees well in 
every aspect.”169 Thomas de Maiziere, the German Minister of Interior, confirmed 
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Germany’s historic responsibility in order to justify its liberal policies.170 A 
representative of a civil society organization stated that many of the activists and 
politicians still remembered or personally experienced post-war displacement and 
therefore “see such [liberal] policies as the right response.”171 Newspaper articles and 
reports by think tanks also associated Germany’s open door policies with lessons learnt 
from the past.172  
 The severity of the crisis also played a role for Germany recognizing its 
responsibility. In interviews, congressional representatives said it was “acute emergency 
assistance,”173 and “one of the worst humanitarian crises”174 that motivated policy 
makers to initiate liberal policies. A civil society representative said that the crisis “left 
nobody unmoved - not even the most conservative politician,”175 and another 
interviewee described the crisis as a specific Umbruchsituation (situation for radical 
change or revolutionary atmosphere) with regards to German refugee policies.176 When 
asked why the recent refugee crisis was perceived as more severe and triggered a 
different response than other humanitarian crises in the past, study participants indicated 
that the media played an important role. “You couldn’t escape the reports and the 
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pictures,” said one politician, “every day new headlines about bombings and people 
dying.”177 A migration expert added that besides the media coverage, people could 
actually see the effects of the crisis. “These poor refugees weren’t somewhere in the 
Middle East far away, they were here. Right in front of our door,” he continued.178 
Consequently, the combination of both a strong liberal media campaign as well as the 
proximity of suffering refugees activated an increased sense of responsibility.  
 As the second part of responsibility, interviewees were asked to describe what 
kind of responsibility they ascribed to the German government. One of the most 
frequent answers was that the country was expected to take in more, or an overall large 
number, of refugees. Especially civil society representatives voiced their preference for 
the continuation of liberal policies. Many organizations publicly stated that Germany 
should accept its responsibility and therefore accept more refugees.179 Congressional 
representatives also supported taking in more refugees in 2015. One Congresswoman 
stated that in hearings, congressional representatives were encouraged to post “refugees 
welcome” on their social media platforms or party websites in an effort to reflect the 
government’s continued commitment to its open door policies.180 Leading politicians 
reaffirmed support for Angela Merkel’s policy course. In April 2015, Volker Kauder, 
the union fraction leader, stated that it would not be a problem for Germany to take in 
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“significantly more refugees.”181 Five months later in September, Vice Chancellor 
Sigmar Gabriel suggested that the country could cope with 500,000 refugees per year.182 
In addition, the media connected Germany’s responsibility with taking in more 
refugees. Articles address numerous reasons as to why the country should accept more 
refugees and continue to liberalize its policies.183 While most actors considered 
accepting and accommodating refugees as Germany’s most vital responsibility, there 
were others who highlighted the country’s responsibility to its citizens. One 
Congressman said that “it is hard to justify more money for accommodating refugees, 
when simultaneously services for citizens are on the decrease.”184 With that, some 
conservative actors tried to counter the government’s open door policies and diffuse 
Germany’s responsibility.  
 Besides helping refugees to come and stay in Germany, the data shows that 
addressing the root causes was another repeatedly mentioned responsibility. This claim 
was used by both conservative actors who favored traditional, restrictive refugee 
policies as well as by liberal actors who viewed fighting the root causes as a long-term 
measure in addition to accepting more refugees in Germany. Even before the country 
began to liberalize its policies in 2015, the topic of humanitarian assistance and 
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development was frequently discussed in parliamentary hearings.185 Politicians across 
the political spectrum connected combating the causes of flight to both ensuring human 
safety and a better future as well as to decreasing the refugee flow to Europe. They 
furthermore criticized the lack of resources provided humanitarian programs and peace-
building missions.186 Especially the opposition has repeatedly called on the government 
to increase resources for development assistance in order to fight poverty, injustice, 
racism, and conflict in developing regions.187 However, they also stressed that focusing 
on the root causes is not the main solution and no substitute for accepting more 
refugees. In an interview a Congresswoman pointed out that “conservatives try to divert 
attention to root causes as an excuse to hinder refugees from coming to Germany. 
That’s not acceptable.”188 With the increasing numbers of refugees, discourse has 
focused more and more on decreasing the reasons for flight. In a parliamentary debate 
in early September 2015, addressing the root causes (Fluchtursachen bekämpfen) 
appeared 70 times.189  Civil society representatives supported the government’s 
commitment to continued and increased humanitarian and development assistance, but 
also identified this as a long-term measure rather than an immediate solution to the 
refugee crisis. Migration experts pointed out that Germany should focus on fragile and 
failing states and invest in crisis prevention and state and peace building.190 In addition 
                                                          
185 See Plenarprotokol 18/94, 18/99, and 18/100.   
186 See Plenarprotokol 18/112. 
187 See the proposal of the opposition: Deutscher Bundestag, Fluchtursachen statt Flüchtlinge Bekämpfen, 
(Berlin, 2015), http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/070/1807046.pdf. 
188 Interview with a die Linke Congresswoman, 05 July, 2016.  
189 See Plenarprotokol 18/120.  
190 Interviews with migration experts, 02 and 29 June, 2016. See also Lutz Warkalla, 
"Entwicklungspolitik Gegen Fluchtursachen," General Anzeiger, December 6, 2015, 1, accessed 
January 30, 2017, http://www.general-anzeiger-bonn.de/news/wirtschaft/region/Entwicklungspolitik-
gegen-Fluchtursachen-article1779678.html.  
 67 
to countering political and economic instability, one scholar said that limiting the 
effects of climate change in vulnerable regions should be central on the Germany’s 
agenda as such will produce the “next big wave of refugees.”191 Overall, all study 
participants saw Germany’s responsibility in addressing the root causes of migration in 
the medium and long term and increasing resources for humanitarian and development 
politics.  
Finally, burden sharing was named as another part of Germany’s responsibility. 
This included not only advocating for more solidarity amongst industrialized countries 
in an effort to increase refugee resettlement, but also acknowledging that southern 
European and developing countries need more assistance with carrying the refugee 
burden. Civil society organizations have been actively reporting the lack of burden 
sharing in the light of the recent refugee crisis. Amnesty International has criticized rich 
countries’ reluctance to accept the responsibility for refugee protection and sharing the 
burden.192 Similarly, Carnegie, the MPI, and the World Economic Forum (WEF) have 
pointed out the global community’s shortcomings in adequately addressing the crisis 
and working together.193 The media has also identified US and Russian response to the 
refugee crisis as insufficient and has called on the governments to take a more pro-
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active role in resolving the crisis.194 In an interview, one Congressman expressed his 
disappointment at the lack of international cooperation with regards to the refugee 
crisis. He stated that he “would like to ask the USA and Russia and many other 
industrialized countries to finally take on responsibility.”195  
Besides highlighting the importance of an overall global response, interviewees 
specifically identified more European solidarity and burden sharing as essential to 
managing the influx of refugees. Almost all interview participants mentioned the need 
for more European solidarity with regards to refugee resettlement and a quota system. 
They pointed out that Germany had taken responsibility by pushing for a united 
European solution and more burden sharing. In parliamentary debates, congressional 
representatives discussed the fair distribution of refugees, the unsustainability of the 
Dublin Regulation, and the responsibility to ease the burden from southern European 
states.196  One Congressman called the reactions of some European governments as 
“shameful,”197 another one described the poor implementation of the agreed quotas as 
“ridiculous.”198 Angela Merkel also viewed the lack of solidarity as unacceptable and 
stated that “it cannot be that three quarters of all asylum seekers are absorbed by only 
five member states of the EU.”199 Think tanks and civil society organizations have 
censured the EU’s inability to find a solution. The European Policy Center called the 
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situation “not a refugee crisis […] but a crisis of solidarity.”200 Carnegie and the ECFR 
have published a number of reports that address the EU’s incapability to find a common 
approach and share the burden.201 Other reports have analyzed the shortcomings of the 
Dublin Regulation and the uneven distribution of refugee responsibility.202 Overall, the 
data suggests that Germany perceives burden sharing and more European solidarity as 
part of their responsibility with regards to the refugee crisis. 
Pressure/Support 
Another dominant theme throughout the discourse can be broadly categorized as 
pressure or support. Pressure refers to the unprecedented activism from various 
stakeholders pushing for liberal refugee policies. Citizens, politicians, the media, and 
civil society voiced liberal policy preferences and influenced the decision making 
process. Support refers to actors’ willingness to help accommodate refugees in 
Germany. It includes the steep increase in voluntarism of politically active and inactive 
members of society. As the two categories are not mutually exclusive, they are grouped 
together. However, this is not to say that an actor who applied pressure was 
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simultaneously engaging in support. Both pressure and support enabled what has been 
termed Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture). 
 As a result of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Middle East, a 
variety of actors including politicians, churches, organizations, and the UNHCR 
pleaded for accepting more refugees.203 With regards to pressure from citizens, a 
congressional representative indicated that her constituents “expected” liberalization of 
refugee policies.204 She continued that “[one] has to listen to voters. If so many tell you 
that [what Germany is doing] is not enough, you take that back to the parliament.”205 
Pressure from civil society and other organization was described as “intense.”206 
Migration experts and civil society representatives actively participated in 
parliamentary debates and presented their policy recommendations. One civil society 
representative said “we told [the Congress] ‘you need to change this’. And they 
understood.” Additionally, the media’s focus on the refugee crisis made it difficult to 
ignore the call for liberal policies. Headlines of war, conflict, and boat disasters as well 
as the picture of a young Syrian boy that drowned in the Mediterranean Sea intensified 
the pressure on the government to become active and respond liberally. A Congressman 
admitted “nobody could escape the media coverage. And they were right to point out 
our shortcomings.”207  
When it comes to the support, congressional representatives praised the 
unprecedented voluntarism and community work. In interviews as well as in 
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parliamentary hearings, politicians acknowledged and thanked activists for their help 
and support.208 Politicians referred to a “broad engagement,” and a “desire to help” 
from organizations, churches, police, and citizens. Migration experts and civil society 
representatives expressed their surprise to so much engagement. The manager of a 
leading civil society organization said that she has been part of the refugee work since 
1984 but she “would have never dreamt” of so much support.209 Others said that they 
had to turn people away or tell them to come back the next day with their donations, 
because shelters were running out of space. Furthermore, people started countless 
initiatives and groups and developed pro-refugee networks to organize volunteer work, 
meetings, and fundraisers. The media informed citizens how they can assist refugees 
which further helped to mobilize volunteers.210 Overall, Germany’s engagement has 
been internationally acknowledged by the EU Commission, the UNHCR, the 
international media, organizations, migration scholars, and state leaders.211 The New 
York Times praised Germany’s magnanimity, the Spanish El Pais supported the 
country’s determined and consistent response, and the British Guardian reported about 
Germany’s welcoming atmosphere.212 The Migration Policy Institute (MPI), the 
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European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), and Carnegie also endorsed 
Germany’s liberal stance while simultaneously calling for more European solidarity.213 
Former U.S. president Barack Obama and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
Antonio Guterres expressed their support for Germany’s pro-refugee campaign and 
praised the decision to take the moral lead.214 This support did not go unnoticed in the 
German Congress. In debates and hearings, politicians highlighted these positive 
national and international attitudes with regards to Germany’s liberal response. Two 
Congressional interviewees mentioned that the government was “well aware” of this 
“global attention,” and that “[it] wanted to live up to the expectations.”215  
While societal pressure in favor of liberalizing refugee policies was pronounced, 
there was also some skepticism and backlash. Newspapers and civil society reported 
diverging attitudes and policy preferences even before the refugee influx in summer 
2015. Citizens were critical of the idea of “unrestrained welcome culture” and 
“uncontrolled mass immigration.”216 Conservative actors and right-leaning groups 
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further underpinned and spread anti-immigration discourse. As a counterargument to 
the liberal policy framework, conservative actors framed citizens’ needs as a priority 
over “redirecting resources to foreigners.”217 These actors invoked different norms in 
order to highlight the government’s obligation to German citizens. This reflects logic of 
consequences as actors stress their duty to safeguard the interests of the German society 
as well as logic of consequences because policy makers identify prioritizing citizens as 
the most appropriate behavior. One interviewee stated that “of course we had some 
skeptical citizens,” and “some of them who didn’t support these [liberal] policies.”218 
Another one added that “the pressure was there from right wing groups and 
conservative citizens who criticized the increase in funding for refugees and the 
decrease in services for citizens.”219 Similarly on the regional level, opinions on how to 
manage the refugee crisis varied amongst European actors early on. Various media 
sources reported on the heterogeneous policy preferences and stressed that especially 
Eastern European members opposed Germany’s liberal agenda.220 Therefore, support 
for Germany’s liberal refugee policies was strong, but not uncontested. 
Leadership  
 The last major theme in the discourse analysis was Germany’s leadership role. 
The country did not only perceive itself as the leader but was also labeled the leader by 
other actors. Angela Merkel stated that if “we lead the way” it is “more probable to find 
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a European solution.”221 A Congressman also pointed out that the country had “a 
leadership responsibility” within Europe.222 In an interview, a Congresswoman referred 
to Germany as “the role model in the crisis,”223 and another one indicated the country 
“needed to lead with positive example.”224 Migration experts pointed out that Germany 
has emerged as the “moral leader” – a “new identity besides their role as the economic 
hegemon.”225 Because of Germany’s strong economic situation, it has acted as a leader 
throughout the Euro crisis. As the country has been known for its hard line in the Greek 
debt crisis, actors have been surprised by Germany’s liberal approach to the refugee 
crisis.226 One civil society representative viewed the country’s moral and humanitarian 
leadership as “revolutionary.”227 Another one said that she did not expect the German 
government to act as “such a humanitarian role model.”228 The media has also been 
particularly vocal about Germany’s unprecedented moral leadership and has praised 
Germany for its liberal policies.229 Organizations have written about the country’s new 
role.230 The MPI and the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and 
Migration (SVR) identified Germany as the main actor that has sufficiently responded 
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to the refugee crisis by not only leading by domestic example but also through its 
efforts to push for a unified solution.231 When asked whether this identity as a moral 
leader was really something new, one Congressman responded that “it was definitely a 
result of a maturing process,” and an “identity check, a reorientation.”232 He added that 
“even though we were previously accepted in a European leadership position, we have 
never been in such an active [moral] role model position.”233 A civil society 
representative said that “if you receive so much praise and support from all corners and 
you lead by domestic example, it is no wonder that you accept your new position.”234 
This discussion of identity again suggests that actors were genuinely motivated by more 
than rational calculation of costs and benefits. 
Although there was conspicuous support for Germany’s moral role in the 
refugee crisis, this does not suggest that the country’s leadership was universally 
accepted and uncontested. On the domestic level, some conservative politicians 
questioned the country’s leadership role in the refugee crisis. One local politician 
indicated that he did not think Germany should have taken the lead and added that “we 
are not the only country in Europe, or the world. Why does it have to be us?”235 On the 
regional level, Germany’s attempt to motivate other European members to follow the 
country’s example and find a common, liberal solution to the refugee crisis was met 
with resistance. This was also pointed out by interviewees who stated that “some 
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European partners did not want to support our approach,”236 and that Germany was 
perceived as “patronizing and a know-it-all.”237    
Overall, the data suggests that while there was broad consensus on Germany’s 
leadership role in the refugee crisis, there was some resistance. However, even 
opponents of the liberal policy felt compelled to admit the relevance of social norms 
and expectations based on Germany’s identity, values and norms. While conservative 
actors might not have changed their positions, they still identified a responsibility to 
respond. Ultimately, the German government perceived itself in a moral leadership role 
and was also, for the most part, identified and celebrated as the moral leader of the 
refugee crisis by domestic and international actors.  
Relationship between the Themes 
 Having discussed the most prominent themes that are connected to Germany’s 
liberal policy decision, I will now illustrate how they relate to one another. 
Understanding the relationship between the different themes will help explain why the 
German government initiated such unprecedented liberal refugee policies.  
It appears that Germany recognized its humanitarian and moral responsibility 
and identified itself as moral leader in the crisis. However, the question of why the 
country shifted from its longstanding restrictive policies to more liberal policies in this 
particular situation remains. The data suggests that internal and external pressure and 
support from a variety of stakeholders was so strong that preexisting pro-refugee norms 
were activated and became more dominant than restrictive norms. This enabled actors 
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to criticize Germany’s past conservative approach as inappropriate and inconsistent 
with the numerous overlapping liberal norms that had not been sufficiently considered.  
The foundation of the pro-refugee policies are undoubtedly rooted in liberal 
norms and values and can be identified as the starting point for the decision. Pressure 
and support from actors acted as an intervening variable that most likely intensified 
Germany’s perception of moral responsibility and leadership. However, this does not 
suggest that the German government did not perceive a sense of moral responsibility 
and leadership before actors started advocating for a liberal approach. It is more likely 
that pressure and support from actors as well as the German government’s perception of 
responsibility and leadership affected and reinforced one other simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the unprecedented agentic pressure and support influenced and 
encouraged the German government to introduce more liberal and bolder refugee 
policies than in the past and to continue this agenda even in the light of national and 
European opposition and criticism. Overall, the liberal policy initiation by the German 
government shows the dynamic interaction between preexisting norms and values and 
agents. It is somewhat surprising that liberal norms have existed for such a long time 
and were only recently activated by actors.  
One explanation for this is that norms do not exist in a vacuum, but they interact 
vertically and horizontally. This means that there is not only one particular norm 
guiding refugee policies, but rather a variety of overlapping national, regional, and 
international norms that influence the decision making process. Even during the 
2015/16 refugee crisis, restrictive norms and rules competed with liberal ones and 
influenced policy makers. These horizontal norm interactions are also recognized by 
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politicians. Many interviewees pointed out that “opinions have not been 
homogenous,”238 or “congruent”239 with regards to the refugee policy course. Civil 
society organizations confirmed that there has been opposition to Germany’s liberal 
approach from the beginning. The MPI stated that with the increase in asylum 
applications in 2015, restrictive voices were present but largely “overshadowed by an 
enormous upsurge of practical solidarity.”240 The SVR reported that while there was 
large support, “sustained controversies” on the “concrete implementation” complicated 
the initial policy making process.241 These clashing norms exist on the national, 
regional, and international level. As German immigration and asylum rules and norms 
are directly linked to European procedures, the decision making process is even more 
complex. While the German government prioritized liberal norms and introduced a 
number of subsequent policies, these new policies somewhat conflicted with 
preexisting, restrictive European measures that Germany had previously championed.  
This illustrates that even the initiation of Germany’s open door policies was not a 
straight forward, uncontested process, but a complex interaction of various overlapping 
norms. 
However, in the case of the 2015/16 refugee crisis, norm verticality has also 
played an important role in the decision making process. For liberal policies to succeed 
over the restrictive alternatives, the interaction between national, regional, and 
international pro-refugee norms was decisive. Liberal refugee norms are 
institutionalized in international and regional treaties as well as incorporated in 
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Germany’s domestic legal system. Hence, national, regional, and international refugee 
norms reinforced and strengthened one another. The existence of a salient pro-refugee 
norm system has also enabled various actors to appeal to these norms. They highlighted 
the importance of refugee protection and state responsibility and defined a liberal 
approach as the most appropriate behavior and simultaneously condemned deviant 
actions. 
This also shows that state identity is driven by values and norms, and explains 
the connection between liberal refugee norms and Germany’s perception of moral 
leadership.242 The above-mentioned normative dynamics revealed Germany’s self-
understanding as a “responsible and progressive state.”243 In this regard, states reflect on 
their values and principles and acknowledge state responsibility and moral obligations 
beyond their territory as a result of an increasingly interconnected world.244 A state 
might therefore accept costs in order to maintain a certain kind of identity.245 In the case 
of Germany, the identification as a moral leader convinced the government to introduce 
liberal policies regardless of the costs and risks. Therefore, the German open door 
legislation represents another convincing empirical case study that illustrates the 
importance of logic of appropriateness in the policy decision making process. 
Undoubtedly, a consequentialist explanation is also helpful with regards to Germany’s 
moral identity. Other international actors as well as citizens expect states with a 
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progressive identity to act in a particular way. Therefore identity is closely connected to 
a state’s reputation. Failing to behave in accordance with one’s expected identity might 
be costly as it threatens state legitimacy and authority. As illustrated earlier, Germany 
understood the consequences of failing to fulfil its promises and commitments and 
acting contrary to its assigned liberal identity. While this surely indicates logic of 
consequences, it also shows that such is informed and guided by rules and norms.246 
Overall, both logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences have played a role in 
Germany’s liberal policy decision and help connect how norms and values shape state 
identity. The interaction between different norms and the mobilization of various actors 
partly explains the initiation of liberal refugee policies, however, why was that pressure 
sufficient in this case, but not in previous cases of mass refugee displacement?   
The discussed reasons for Germany’s responsibility offer insights into why the 
support and pressure from a variety of actors could push the German government 
towards unprecedented liberal policies. Study participants identified the severity of the 
crisis as one of the most important drivers for the turn to liberal policies. The emotional 
framing of the Syrian refugee crisis and connected disasters and deaths intensified the 
reaction by the German society and government to advocate and push for liberal 
policies. Such a unilateral coverage of and interest in a humanitarian crisis had been 
unprecedented.247 During previous immigration and refugee inflows, liberal norms and 
pro-refugee proponents were not as active as in the recent refugee crisis. In the 1990s, 
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the only organized help for refugees came from leftwing activist, religious 
organizations, and some volunteers. As a response to increased attacks on refugee 
housing, some citizens participated in candle-lit demonstrations, however, the majority 
remained “indifferent.”248 There was almost no pronounced pro-refugee media 
coverage; quite the opposite, as many news sources exaggerated the negative image of 
the “illegitimate refugee.”249 However, the severity of the 2015/16 crisis was diffused 
through numerous reports, articles, documentaries, pictures, and speeches. Support from 
citizens exploded and social media volunteer networks “Berlin hilft” (Berlin helps) or 
“Refugees welcome.” Organizations had to turn away volunteers and donations because 
of the unparalleled engagement. Popular newspapers such as Spiegel Online or Bild 
supported the liberal policy agenda and published fact lists in order to counter prejudice 
and anti-refugee attitudes.250 Other media sources including Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
Die Welt predominantly appealed to emotions by depicting photo series and refugee 
stories.251 In the center of this humanitarian campaign was the urge to help because 
people were subject to severe bodily harm or even death. In addition, it appears that 
actors easily identified Germany’s responsibility with regards to the refugee crisis. The 
disheartening events in the Middle East, pictures of people dying on their journey to 
Europe, and Germany’s national and international commitment to protect refugees 
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present a short and transparent causal chain. Therefore various actors were able to 
connect the refugee crisis with Germany’s responsibility. Scholars have identified the 
risk of bodily harm and the death of vulnerable individuals as well as a short and clear 
causal chain as decisive factors for successfully mobilizing actors and revitalizing norm 
pressure (see Figure 2.1. for visualization of the two factors).252 In the German case, this 
explains why and how liberal norms were activated and why pressure for pro-refugee 
policies succeeded over restrictive ones. Normative systems are unable to cover every 
situation.253 This incompleteness generates conflicts amongst stakeholders, especially 
during times of crises.254 These normative arguments are somewhat inevitable as rules 
are indeterminate and permit multiple, plausible interpretations, thereby challenging 
actors with different preferences to collectively choose one. Liberal actors were 
challenging the status quo in regards to traditional refugee policies by appealing to 
widely respected refugee and human rights norms, thereby making a moral claim for a 
policy change. They stressed that the severity of the crisis required a different 
interpretation of norms. This was further strengthened by the ubiquitous support from a 
variety of societal actors, who questioned the appropriateness of the restrictive rules and 
procedures.  
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Figure 2.1. Factors influencing liberal norm and support activation  
 Overall, the analysis of Germany’s motivations for initiating unprecedented 
liberal refugee policies in 2015 aligns with constructivist scholarship. The discussed 
themes illustrate how and why the government decided to deviate from its long-
standing, restrictive policy framework and responded so liberally. While a rationalist 
explanation could stress the country’s need for skilled workers or the concern of its 
international reputation, the study findings suggest that such reasons played a peripheral 
role. Instead, the data shows that normative factors such as values, rules, moral and 
humanitarian responsibility were far more decisive than any cost-benefit analysis.  
I have also explained the relationship between the different themes and 
illustrated the decision making process. It appears that the underlying liberal norms and 
values were activated by the enormous pressure from actors across the political 
spectrum. The mass pressure and support also triggered the government’s perception of 
humanitarian responsibility. The country accepted and embraced its role as moral leader 
by setting a domestic example and advocating for more solidarity and burden sharing. 
The reason why liberal norms and pressure were not as successful during previous 
Factor 1:
Bodily Harm or Death of 
vulnerable individuals 
Bodily harm: Syrian war, boat 
disasters, overcorwded refugee 
camps 
Indivudals: refugees, asylum 
seeker
Liberal Norms
Pressures/Support from 
Actors
Factor 2:
Short transparent causual chain 
War/conflict  escape/journey 
to Europe 
commitment/responsibilty
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immigration and refugee inflows has to do with the dynamic interaction between 
overlapping norms. Liberal norms have been competing vertically and horizontally with 
conservative norms. However, restrictive policies remained dominant in the past, 
because agentic liberal pressure was not as developed as in the case of the 2015/16 
refugee crisis. Pro-refugee norms and the subsequent pressure and support from actors 
was activated in this particular instance because of the severity of the crisis and the 
short, clear causal chain. The emotional framing of the crisis portrayed individuals 
subject to severe bodily harm and death and therefore intensified Germany’s desire to 
help. Additionally, German society was able to easily comprehend the severity of the 
crisis. The pictures of war and conflict and people travelling to Europe to seek asylum 
increased Germany’s perception of responsibility and moral leadership. Overall, the 
severity of this crisis in combination with Germany’s history triggered unprecedented 
societal pressure and support which resulted in the activation of preexisting liberal 
norms and Germany’s moral leadership.   
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Chapter 3: Germany’s Reversal of its Liberal Refugee Policies 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will investigate why Germany reintroduced conservative 
policies shortly after the initiation of its unprecedented liberal measures in the first half 
of 2015. While the sexual assault attacks on New Year’s Eve of 2015/16 have been 
frequently cited as the turning point in Germany’s liberal refugee approach, a closer 
investigation of government discourse and interview data suggests that the shift 
happened much earlier. Shortly after inviting thousands of refugees to come to 
Germany, the government reinstated temporary border controls on September 13, 
2015.255 This was the first of many more restrictive measures on both the national and 
European level. But what motivated the government to divert from its liberal agenda? 
As explored in the previous chapter, the severity of the humanitarian crisis and a short, 
transparent causal chain initially reinforced liberal norms and practices and replaced the 
long-standing restrictive approach to asylum. Therefore, Germany’s abrupt policy 
change represents a puzzle for constructivists because the factors that produced the 
initial shift towards liberal policies still remained. Even though rationalists might point 
towards the increasing economic and security costs and consider the policy reversal 
merely a result of logic of consequences, the empirical evidence suggests a more 
nuanced explanation.  
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Throughout this chapter, I will illustrate how horizontal and vertical norm 
interaction figured centrally in the decision making process during the shift from liberal 
to conservative refugee polices. The data shows how actors perceived material factors 
and values differently depending on which norms they had internalized and prioritized. 
This led to the development of diverging policy preferences. Ultimately, the policy shift 
was triggered because conservative actors successfully framed conservative norms as 
both the most appropriate behavior (logic of appropriateness) as well as less costly in 
the short and long term (logic of consequences). They stressed that conservative 
policies do not blatantly violate and actually integrate core liberal values as well as 
reflect appropriate procedural rules and behavior. Besides pointing towards the 
economic and security risks, conservative actors argued that Germany’s unilateral 
approach and lack of communication during the development of liberal policies irritated 
European partners and subnational governments and violated procedural rules. This 
created uncertainty and disrupted ontological security. Simultaneously, actors 
contended that liberal policies failed to provide a long-term solution and are, regardless 
of material factors, not the appropriate behavior in the light of increasing criticisms and 
lack of solidarity. The findings of this empirical study suggest that a multitude of 
factors, which combine both logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness, 
account for the policy reversal. While scholars have started to explore how mixed 
motives operate in social situations, more needs to be done in this regard.  
In the first part of this chapter, I will provide a comprehensive overview of the 
conservative refugees policies, which have been initiated throughout the policy shift 
(September 2015 – August 2016) as a contrast to the liberal policies discussed in 
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Chapter 2. This will be followed by a discussion of the empirical study and the most 
prominent themes. Lastly, I will demonstrate how the themes are connected, and how 
they explain the reintroduction of conservative refugee policies.  
Germany’s Reintroduction of Conservative Policies  
 This section will review the introduction of more restrictive refugee policies 
beginning in September 2015 until September 2016. German decision makers supported 
and pushed for measures that focused on preventing refugee arrivals, complicating 
access to protection and services, and outsourcing responsibility to non-EU countries. 
While national and regional policies are interconnected, the decision making process is 
different on the two levels. I will therefore discuss German and European measures 
separately to better illustrate the policy making dynamics. 
Restrictive Refugee Policies on the National Level  
 One of the first steps in the conservative policy shift was the closing of the 
border that became effective on the evening of September 13, 2015. The large influx of 
refugees within only a few weeks had brought the country and its neighbors to the limit. 
63,000 people had arrived in Munich since late August, with a peak of 13,000 one day 
before the border closure.256 Consequently, the German government recalled their 
announcement of border-free movement for refugees and stated that passage would only 
be granted to EU citizens and visa holders. Police started patrolling the southern 
borders, and train traffic to Munich was halted. In the parliamentary debate only a few 
days prior to the decision, Merkel indicated the policy shift. She announced that “we 
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cannot simply continue as we have, rather we have to rethink rules and temporarily 
suspend rules,” referring to both the future of the liberal refugee policies as well as the 
anticipated, temporary exit from the Schengen system.257 The in September of 2015 
introduced border controls have been upheld throughout 2016 and are expected to 
continue much of 2017.258 
The German Congress passed the so-called “Asylum Packages I and II” 
(Asylpakete I und II) in October 2015 and March 2016 respectively.259 These packages 
entail stricter right to stay and easier deportation requirements. Individuals with medical 
and psychological conditions that are not categorized as serious or life-threatening are 
subject to deportations. Additionally, the reformed right to stay allows deportations of 
criminal foreigners with a one-year minimum sentence. Albania, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro were declared “safe countries of origin,” which accelerates the asylum 
process and simplifies repatriations.260 Furthermore, benefits for asylum-seekers were 
cut and connected to the asylum process, meaning that people who are unregistered and 
without a “refugee ID” will not receive full benefits. In order to share the cost for 
integration and language courses, 10 Euros are deducted from every refugee’s monthly 
allowance (143 Euro), regardless of their ability or legal qualification to participate in 
the courses.261 Subsequent immigration of dependents is only possible for asylum 
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seekers who are able to prove individual prosecution. Those who fail to provide such 
evidence only receive subsidiary protection, which suspends their right to family 
reunification for two years. This rule also applies to unaccompanied minor refugees. 
Just as with Albania, Slovenia, and Montenegro, the German government declared the 
Maghreb states as safe countries of origin as of June 2016. Applicants from these 
countries, although they still enjoy individual asylum rights, face faster procedures and 
a higher chance of being denied asylum.  
The new integration law, with its guiding principle that is best translated as 
“encourage and expect” (fördern und fordern), was introduced in August 2016 and aims 
at balancing the rights and responsibilities of refugees.262 While the government 
increased the budget for integration, language, and professional courses and improved 
access to vocational training and employment, refugees are expected to participate and 
promote their own integration process more actively or face sanctions. Though the law 
has been considered as a milestone in the country’s migration and asylum system and 
appears to be fairly liberal, refugees encounter a variety of disadvantages and 
restrictions that could hinder rather than foster their integration process. The so called 
“residence requirement” (Wohnauflage) forbids them to move freely through Germany 
and requires them to live and work in the assigned community. This limits refugees’ 
access to the labor and housing market and violates their right to move freely. Refugees 
also face benefits cuts if they do not participate in language courses or in their asylum 
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process –unintentional misunderstandings or traumatized circumstances that might limit 
their participation are rarely taken into account.  
Within only a few months, Germany passed numerous laws and enforced 
regulations that compromise the quality of refugee protection. Besides a shift towards 
more conservative policies on the domestic level, Germany also supported restrictive 
measures on the European level.   
Restrictive Refugee Policies on the European level   
 European leaders met in September 2015 to discuss the role of the West Balkans 
in the refugee crisis. The European Commission proposed a common list of safe 
countries that includes most Balkan nations. This greatly diminishes the chances of 
asylum for individuals originating from one of these countries. Additionally, the option 
of closing the Balkan route in order to stem the refugee influx and prevent individuals 
from reaching central Europe was discussed. In March 2016, several Eastern European 
countries closed their borders, effectively sealing the route. Donald Tusk, the chief of 
the European Council, expressed gratitude towards Balkan states “for implementing 
part of EU’s comprehensive strategy to deal with migration crisis.”263 While Merkel 
officially condemned the Balkan route closure, many other conservative party members 
secretly welcomed the decision and called it a success.264 
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 In addition to the Balkan closure, the EU increased its efforts to establish 
agreements with third countries in order to reduce the number of people leaving in the 
first place as well as to repatriate failed asylum seekers. Negotiations with Turkey 
started in September 2015, and the official EU-Turkey deal came into effect on 18 
March 2016. The agreement permits asylum seekers residing in Greece to be returned to 
Turkey. This alleviates the EU’s responsibility for processing and accommodating 
asylum seekers and assumes that Turkey is a safe third country. Human rights groups 
and the UNHCR have heavily criticized the deal as it decreases access to and the quality 
of refugee protection. Furthermore, the agreement with Turkey has motivated the EU to 
negotiate similar deals with other African, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries. In June 
2016, the European Commission announced the new partnership framework for 
countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, and Libya. The framework aims to “increase the 
rate of returns to countries of origins and transit, and [to] enable migrants and refugees 
to stay close to home (…).”265 Germany has been a strong supporter and a driving force 
in the negotiation and policy making framework. 266 
 The EU also expanded the protection of its external borders. In December 2015, 
the European Commission proposed a new border and coast guard with a stronger 
mandate and more resources. The European Border and Coast Guard agency was 
officially launched on 6 October 2016 and includes Frontex as well as national border 
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authorities.267 The new regulation prioritizes regaining and maintaining control over 
irregular migration. The potential security risks associated with the increasing numbers 
of refugees arriving and traveling through Europe are to be minimized, and internal 
security is to be safeguarded.268 The agency enjoys more autonomy and is able to 
intervene if a member state fails to effectively control its own borders. Critics have 
pointed out that this kind of autonomy and lack of oversight decreases accountability 
and thus might compromise human rights and refugee protection. While the regulation 
stresses return operations, it falls short of an explicit search and rescue mandate. In 
addition to the new agency, the EU has also expanded the mandate of its Naval Force 
Med Operation Sophia to include the training of Libya’s coast guard. However, the 
increased involvement of the Libyan coast guard also means fewer asylum seekers’ 
arrival in Europe. Ships under European flag cannot legally return refugees to Libya as 
the country is not regarded a safe third country and is known for human rights abuses. 
However, if individuals are rescued by Libyan authorities, the EU bears no 
responsibility. Asylum seekers can be returned to Libya, a non-signatory of the Refugee 
Convention and a country without a functioning asylum system.   
 Another restrictive measure on the European level is the resumption of the 
Dublin regulation. The Dublin system requires that the asylum status of migrants must 
be determined in the first European country of arrival, and that asylum seekers may be 
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sent back to the respective first country of arrival. Germany had reintroduced the Dublin 
system for Syrian refugees in October 2015 and started returning refugees to the first 
EU country of arrival, not including Greece.269 In 2011 the ECtHR and the CJEU halted 
all Dublin transfers to Greece because of the systemic deficiencies in the country’s 
asylum system. However, in February and June 2016, the European Commission 
discussed the first steps towards gradually resuming Dublin transfers to Greece and thus 
to reestablish orderly procedure.270 Even though, the European Commission recognized 
that Greece “has made some improvements”271 and that “still further progress [needs] to 
be achieved, notably on reception facilities, access to asylum procedures and structures 
for vulnerable applicants,”272 the restoration of Dublin transfers to the country is 
anticipated for March 2017. This move was also encouraged by the German 
government, and the process for the reestablishment of Dublin transfers to Greece was 
set in motion in December 2016. Germany’s revived support for the Dublin system on 
both the national and European level represents a sharp contrast to the liberal policy of 
suspending the regulation in favor of guaranteeing unrestricted access to protection in 
2015.  
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 In summary, Germany introduced a number of restrictive refugee policies on the 
national level while simultaneously promoting European measures to outsource and 
diffuse responsibility as well as to limit refugee arrivals and access to protection. The 
new German laws were all passed hastily. And although European leaders seemed 
unable to find common ground on liberalizing refugee policies, they were fast when it 
came to agreeing on the restriction and reduction of irregular migrant flows.273   
Some of the above mentioned policy changes represent almost the exact 
opposite of what the German government had introduced in the first half of 2015. So 
why did the German government shift to more restrictive policies only a few months 
after introducing an unprecedented liberal policy approach? While a rationalist 
explanation that stresses the rising material costs associated with the refugee influx is 
certainly promising, a careful analysis of the data suggests a more complex decision 
making process beyond the consequentialist perspective. Actors evaluated and weighted 
material factors and values differently depending on which norms they had internalized 
and prioritized. This led to the development of diverging policy preferences. The data 
also indicates some variation within the conservative and liberal camp, meaning that 
actors acknowledged different sets of norms. For example, within the liberal and 
conservative camps, actors utilized norms to contest other norms which complicated the 
decision making process. Representatives of the most conservative party stressed the 
importance of liberal refugee protection norms and rules, however indicated that the 
country’s responsibility to protect its citizens needed to be prioritized. Similarly, 
supporters of liberal refugee policies recognized that the influx of refugees within the 
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short time period had placed an unanticipated strain on public services, which ought to 
be addressed in subsequent policies in order to address the concerns of worried citizens. 
This illustrates that norm internalization by actors with a given identity is not 
necessarily a homogenous, static process, and that actors might accept a variety of rules, 
some which might even contradict their preferred policy framework. While actors might 
admit the validity of certain alternative norms that call for a different policy response, 
they nevertheless prioritize the norms they find most appropriate and in line with their 
preferences. This explains why, although conservative actors recognized liberal refugee 
provisions, they continued to push for the discontinuation of the open door policy.  
Additionally, it appears that material factors alone were not the main driver for 
the policy change, but that a return to conservative policies was perceived as the most 
appropriate behavior. The empirical study below will illustrate the horizontal and 
vertical norm interaction and introduce the most prominent themes, which will help to 
understand the dynamics of change.  
Empirical Study: Motivations for the Shift 
 The interview data collected from May through July 2016 serves as the primary 
data source for the subsequent empirical study. Overall, 20 participants were 
interviewed including members of the Bundestag, representatives of civil society 
organizations, migration and security experts, as well as local politicians. While two 
interviews were conducted over phone, the majority was conducted in person. This was 
especially beneficial as I was able to observe both the spoken word as well as body 
language. Besides the field data, I reviewed media sources and reports from civil 
society organizations to illustrate the perceptions of and attitudes towards the policy 
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shift. The data suggests that policy makers evaluated both consequences and 
appropriateness of the continuation of the liberal policies as well as the reintroduction 
of conservative refugee policies. The empirical study identifies (1) security and 
economics, (2) lack of solidarity, and (3) Germany’s unilateral approach.   
Security and Economics  
 Actors commonly referenced the increasing numbers of refugees and rising 
economic and security concerns. Many participants associated these material constraints 
as a direct result of the continued refugee arrivals over a short time period. Others 
recognized the strain on public services and a potential security risk, however, they 
emphasized that failed integration rather than the ongoing refugee influx produces a 
negative economic and security situation. Therefore, policy makers and civil society 
representatives tried to advance their policy preferences partly through the different 
framing of (1) the refugee influx and (2) the economic and security concerns.  
Conservative politicians expressed in interviews their preference for a shift back 
towards more “controlled” refugee policies.274 One Congressional representative 
mentioned that “while we uphold our obligations under the refugee convention, we still 
have the right to regulate and limit the number of refugees, as we used to do in the 
past.”275 Another Congress member echoed the previous statement and added “instead 
of reinventing the wheel, we should just modify [conservative] policies – more effective 
deportations, more border control, more resources to fight root causes.”276 A local 
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politician indicated that “it is true that we have the duty to grant asylum under article 16 
[of the German constitution], but we have already been doing that before the refugee 
crisis and the new [liberal] policies. Also, we shouldn’t forget about Dublin, we have to 
follow Dublin.”277 Another Congressman said “we have to keep in mind that the refugee 
status is a temporary status,” and that this was “universally accepted and implemented.” 
He went on, “We can’t continue to create more incentives [for refugees] to come, 
considering the current influx.”278  
 In particular, study participants from the ruling, predominantly CDU/CSU and 
some SPD politicians, interpreted the high numbers of refugees in a more negative way 
and framed them accordingly. When asked about the economic and security costs, one 
Congressman referred to the refugee situation as “refugee problem” 279 
(Flüchtlingsproblematik), and another one stated that the “refugee wave” 
(Flüchtlingswelle) was “unsustainable” because of the material costs as well as 
obligations owed to citizens.280 This discourse is also reflected in numerous 
parliamentary debates when representatives used “refugee avalanche,” 
(Flüchtlingslawine), “refugee flood” (Flüchtlingsflut), and “refugee run” 
(Flüchtlingsandrang) to describe the new arrivals. Decision makers aimed to advance 
their conservative refugee policies and intensify the sense of risk by creating similes 
that compare the increasing numbers of refugees to waves and floods. Such phrasing 
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further highlighted the emergency situation and the urgency for a swift, more effective 
policy response and hinted at a potential policy change.  
On the contrary, liberal politicians and civil society representatives used more 
sensitive wording. They stressed the human factor of migration and refrained from 
homogenizing refugees by labeling them as masses. In an interview, one female 
representative of the opposition called out the framing strategies of the CDU/CSU and 
SPD. She said that “[the government’s] attempt to dehumanize refugees by associating 
them with swarms or hordes is shameful (…) and feeds into conservative and populist 
discourse.”281 This highly emotionally charged language suggests a violation of a 
standard of appropriate behavior. Another opposition Congresswoman confirmed 
“people pick up and reproduce such phrases, and now we are surprised about their anti-
immigrant attitude.”282 In parliamentary debates, the opposition has publicly criticized 
the ruling parties for introducing such “terminology.”283 One Congress member accused 
the Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, of “fuel[ing] the mood against refugees” 
through “malicious expressions.”284 Another Congressional representative asked other 
politicians to reconsider whether “it is appropriate to speak of a flood or wave, as we 
are talking about humans after all.”285 The opposition has also pointed out that this 
discourse is used to promote and justify a more restrictive approach to the refugee 
crisis. One member highlighted that the refugee movement towards Europe is equated 
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with “threat scenarios and tsunamis,”286 while another representative stated that the 
refugee situation is discussed as “a threat or a situation that is unmanageable.”287  
 Similarly, the various actors framed the security and economic concerns 
differently. Many interviewees of the CDU/CSU and SPD emphasized Germany’s 
limited capacity, an overwhelmed system, and the potentially increased terror risk and 
crime rates. A Congresswoman indicated that “we saw factual problems such as 
registration, accommodation - simply that we reached our logistic boundaries. (...) And, 
it needs to be said that our possibilities to continue accepting and accommodating such 
large numbers are simply limited.”288 Another Congressman stated, “German citizens 
have no fun financing refugees in the medium and long term. That’s why we needed to 
create stricter laws to hold refugees accountable for their economic integration.”289 
When it comes to the security aspect, participants pointed towards the increased risk of 
terror attacks, refugee as well as hate crimes. One Congressman highlighted that 
“Germany’s priority remains to protect its citizens. That’s our main responsibility.”290 
This indicates that conservative actors not only used consequentialist reasoning, but also 
appealed to different sets of norms in order to promote conservative policies. In 
parliamentary debates, politicians blamed liberal refugee polices for enabling large 
numbers of irregular migrants to enter Germany without being controlled or 
identified.291 Additionally, the sexual assaults on New Year’s Eve of 2015/16 were 
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mentioned in order to promote the policies for accelerated deportations of criminal 
refugees.292  
Interestingly however, not all actors who favored a restrictive approach 
perceived a heightened security or economic situation. Conservative local politicians, 
who advocated for the reversal of liberal refugee policies, admitted that they could not 
identify worsened or unmanageable economic or security conditions. One local 
politician described the initial refugee policies as “a complete failure,” but not because 
of the imposed economic burden or security risk but “because we have never done 
[migration] that way, and we weren’t prepared.”293 Another local politician responded 
similarly when asked if the community had reached its capacity, or if there were 
increased security concerns. He said that they had “no complaints, no increase in 
crimes, and enough housing,” and that overall financial resources were sufficient to 
cope with the refugee influx. Some Congress members from the CDU/CSU and SPD 
also reported that while economic and security pressure had increased, it was 
manageable. A CDU Congressman said that “Germany is surely far from reaching its 
logistical and material capacities. I would disagree with whoever claims differently.”294 
In regards to the argument about the increased security risk he stated that “for me, the 
right to asylum trumps my fear of potential terror attacks.” Another Congressman 
identified the risk emanating from refugees as “not a central concern.”295  
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Other actors such as the opposition, civil society representatives as well as 
migration experts associated different material consequences with the refugee influx 
and stressed that a stricter approach or the absence of more liberal policies created 
economic and security issues. Congressional representatives stressed that increasing 
access to education, the job market, and health services will foster integration and 
ensure high standards of refugee protection. While they recognized the increasing 
pressure on the economy and did not dismiss the possibility of terrorist or criminal 
activity, they focused on the lack of liberal integration measures as a source for 
potential economic and security problems. They also alluded to the rising threat 
emanating from right wing and populist activities and the rapid increase in hate crimes. 
One Congresswoman stated that “Germany is the strongest country in the EU, our 
economy is doing better than ever before and refugees haven’t changed a thing about 
that.” She continued that “failed integration would be the real economic nightmare” and 
that refugee integration “will decrease long term costs and benefit Germany. Refugees 
are a huge chance economically as well as for our societal development.” 296 A civil 
society representative listed “too little access to the labor market, lack of language 
teachers and instructors, no free movement, and many more restrictive and integration-
hindering policies” as the “most costly economic decision.”297  
In a parliamentary debate, one congressional representative warned not to “fight 
the debate on internal security on the backs of the refugees. Of course we cannot 
preclude the chance of a terrorist or a criminal mixing with the refugees. All this does, 
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in no case, justify a general suspicion against refugees.”298 A migration expert in an 
interview added that while “suspicious activities need[ed] to be monitored” and that a 
terrorist attack “can never be ruled out,” the greater risk for radicalization rests in the 
“establishment of parallel societies and marginalization.”299 A civil society 
representative said that she “could imagine one or the other [terrorist] coming into the 
country. But those organizations were in Germany long before the refugee influx.” She 
continued that “from my experience, criminal activity is low. Refugees are no more 
criminal than Germans.”300 This was also confirmed by a security specialist, a chief 
police officer, whose commission gathered and evaluated data of refugee crimes. In the 
interview, he stated that “the majority of refugees are harmless.”301 Therefore, the 
majority of liberal actors perceived the continuation of liberal refugee policies as 
appropriate and as a means to protect refugees and heavily criticized the return to 
restrictive measures. A migration expert explained that “European human rights and 
international law, especially in regards to refugees, has been steadily developing. We 
call this judicial activism. This ensures that laws evolve and remain appropriate over 
time.” She continued, “Therefore the liberal refugee policy response was necessary and 
adequate, while the move back to our old ways is counterproductive.”302  A civil society 
representative expressed a similar view and indicated that “the proposed [conservative] 
laws compromise Article 1, 16, and 18 of the German Constitution. As a matter of fact, 
some parts of the new regulations represent the toughest restrictions on asylum since the 
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1990s.”303 Another civil society representative confirmed the trend towards restrictive 
refugee policies and added that “we have been witnessing the attempt to stop and deter 
refugees earlier and faster. Quite the opposite of what we have been doing in early 
2015.”304 In parliamentary debates, members of the opposition heavily censured the 
introduction of restrictive laws and policies claiming that they violate universal norms 
of refugee protection as well as European values of freedom, justice, and peace. One 
Congress member said that the EU-Turkey deal was the “sad highlight of your refugee 
deterrent policies,” 305 while another representative called the Turkish President 
Erdoğan a “personified root cause and not part of the solution.”306 In regards to 
restricting the right to family renunciation, one congressional member stated that “this 
has adverse integration effects and is, considering the German constitution, more than 
problematic.”307 
When asked about the security risks, many participants pointed towards the 
increase in hate crimes. One civil society representative stated that “the real problem is 
the dramatic rise in attacks against refugees, and that we continue to underestimate 
it.”308 A security expert asserted that “if you take the naked numbers, the greatest 
danger emanates from right wing violence.”309 Another migration expert reaffirmed this 
by saying “we need to pay much more attention to right wing criminal activity and hate 
crimes. These developments are scary.”310 Many politicians from the CDU/CSU and 
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SPD also reacted very sensitively to the violence against refugees. One Congressman 
pointed out the “the dangerous trend of crimes committed against refugees,” he 
continued to compare hate crimes with refugee crimes and stated that “offences directed 
towards refugees are six to ten times higher than crimes committed by refugees.”311  
While most liberal actors supported the continuation of liberal policies, a 
number of interviewees also expressed the need for limits. One civil society 
representative indicated that “in order to ensure high standard protection, we need to 
somewhat limit the number of refugees.”312 Another one said that she did not think that 
“Germany’s liberal refugee policies means accepting everybody and taking in unlimited 
numbers of refugees,” and added that “we also have to consider other minority groups 
and the overall population within Germany.”313 A Congresswoman from the opposition 
also echoed this view and stated that “we overall have to reorganize our refugee policies 
in order to satisfy both the needs of vulnerable populations such as refugees as well as 
our constituencies.”314 This illustrates that even liberal actors recognized alternative sets 
of norms such as the country’s obligations to its citizens and therefore acknowledged 
the need for policy adjustment.  
Overall, actors recognized a variety of security and economic concerns that had 
arisen as a result of the refugee influx. Conservative actors tended to frame the refugee 
numbers in a more negative way and discussed the strain on public services as well as 
the terror risk and increase in crime. Liberal actors on the other hand focused more on a 
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positive frame, but stressed that insufficient integration measures as well as increasing 
negative attitudes and violence against refugees are more likely to harm Germany’s 
economy and security.  
Germany’s Unilateral Approach  
Interviewees frequently mentioned Germany’s unilateral approach in regards to 
initiating liberal policies. Many criticized the country’s lack of communication and 
isolated decision making on the national and European level. Especially conservative 
Congressional representatives stressed that having made decisions that greatly affected 
other countries without coordinating them with EU partners was detrimental and a 
violation of common practices. They also stressed that it disrupted actors’ ontological 
security. One Congressman stated that “suspending Dublin without any communication 
with most of our neighbors is not fair and not what Europe stands for.”315 A 
Congresswoman echoed this view and added that “we should have better anticipated the 
consequences for what would happen if we open the doors – for us and especially for 
other countries.”316 Another Congresswoman expressed that “we had fixed rules. We 
never had a resettlement mechanism or a quota system.”317 A local politician implied 
that the country’s unilateral approach and the criticism it earned, threatened Germany’s 
understanding as a central player in the EU and therefore disrupted its ontological 
security. He stated that “we were heavily criticized. Publicly and behind closed doors. 
And not only by countries which had opposed our policies from the beginning, but also 
by countries like France. And you don’t want to be criticized by your closest partners. 
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That’s bad.”318 Another local politician echoed this perspective and added, “Germany is 
jeopardizing its role in the EU,” with its “solo run.”319 
In parliamentary debates, Congress members expressed similar views. As an 
example, one representative said, “we Germans broke Dublin III. We pressured other 
countries to open their borders. (…) One can perhaps understand the absence of great 
enthusiasm to accommodate the refugees that we invited.”320 Furthermore, one local 
politician said that “Merkel pressed ahead without coordination with European leaders, 
and now we have the disaster. The European leaders complain and say: [Germany] can’t 
do this, they can’t force something upon us they fabricated in a solo effort.”321 The 
suspension of Dublin came as a surprise because Germany had been one of the strongest 
supporters of the system and had been reluctant to change these rules. One 
Congressman said that the “dissolution of clear commitments, meaning that Germany, 
of all countries, did not follow Dublin – that was a shock.”322 Two local politicians 
viewed the suspension of Dublin and several other liberal policies as “a violation of 
European standards.” One said, “we had European [asylum] policies, but Germany 
decided to impose another set of policies on Europeans. But these do not reflect 
European asylum policies. There is a European course, but that is not the German 
one.”323 Newspapers also voiced that Germany’s isolationist approach and liberal 
approach violated European rules.324 While the opposition labeled the country’s 
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unilateral liberal agenda as “brave,”325 they also acknowledged that “a little more 
coordination would not have hurt.”326 Der Spiegel wrote that Merkel “is calling into 
question the very rules that Germany once put in place to deter immigrants. No wonder 
so many other heads of state are accusing the chancellor of imposing her will on them 
(…).”327  
Besides the suspension of Dublin, study participants also pointed towards the 
lack of communication and transparency between the federal government and local 
communities.  A civil society representative indicated that “there was just complete 
uncertainty of what is going to happen next. It was like, you come in to work in the 
morning, and you wouldn’t know what to expect.”328  A local politician expanded by 
saying that “there was literally no communication with Berlin. They would just send us 
busses with new refugees – unannounced – spontaneous ambushes so to speak. We 
would get a call that new busses with 500 refugees just arrived at the district office.”329 
When speaking about the initiation of several liberal policies, another local politician 
said “we had no clue what they would come up with next. They would pass a law that 
theoretically created new jobs for refugee administrators or German teachers. We were 
supposed to implement it, but how? Just because you have the laws does not mean you 
have the [human] resources.” Another one added that “you need to communicate with 
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your districts and communities and see what they need and what they can do. It seemed 
like they had no understanding of what was going or didn’t want to deal with it – like 
running around with blinkers.” It appears that the lack of transparency and 
communication created a state of uncertainty and disrupted actors’ ontological security. 
A local politician reaffirmed this by asserting that “we could have and still can handle 
the situation. With a little more coordination and communication this would have been 
half as bad. We could have planned better and would have been more prepared.”330 
Besides drawing attention to how the miscommunication affected their material 
preparedness, local politicians also implied that it violated appropriate “democratic” 
behavior.331 With respect to how the community and the local government perceived the 
policies, another answered that “we perceived them badly, because we weren’t 
informed. We heard about them through the media. So the media basically updated us 
on government policies.”332 Another one said that “we need points of orientation, you 
know communication of policies, that’s how it’s supposed to work [in a democracy].”333 
And yet another one expressed that he was “still puzzled as to why the government did 
not involve us” in the policy making process.334  
What also needs to be addressed in this section are the changing attitudes 
amongst the broader society due to the changed economic and security situation and 
Germany’s lack of communication. Congressional representatives and local politicians 
reported very different experiences with their constituencies. One Congressman sensed 
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a drastic change within his district and stated that in in the second half of 2015 and 
throughout 2016, talking about refugees was “more like citizen crisis management than 
refugee crisis management.”335 However, another one stated that he “did not perceive 
any substantial worsening of peoples’ opinions or attitudes in the district.”336 Local 
politicians indicated a variety of attitudes and stressed that conservative and liberal 
opinions were fairly balanced. A conservative local politician said the acceptance of the 
liberal policy approach “has changed a little bit, but mostly remained the same. The 
majority of our people want to help,”337 while another stated that “the welcoming 
culture has completely changed.”338 Civil society representatives echoed that there has 
been an increase in clashing attitudes within the German society. One civil society 
member identified “two sides,” referring to the liberal and conservative attitudes, and 
added that “the picture is very heterogeneous.”339  Another representative confirmed 
that “attitudes are mixed but pretty balanced,” and added that “however, it is hard to 
find somebody without an opinion. While before, there were some neutral people, it 
seems like most of them have chosen a side.”340 Media sources reported about the 
societal split and pointed towards both the increase in right wing discourse as well as 
the continued efforts and engagement of volunteers and civil society organizations.341 
Throughout 2016, many newspaper articles depicted the decrease in popularity for 
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Merkel’s and her liberal policies,342 yet other sources report that citizens support the 
welcoming culture.343 
Lack of solidarity 
 The lack of solidarity in the EU as well as the theoretical rather than practical 
support by other international actors was referenced frequently in interviews, media 
sources, and civil society reports. Study participants not only censured the continued 
resistance of European partners to find a common solution, but also discussed the 
reasons for the paucity in European solidarity, and how it contributed to the policy shift. 
One Congressman stated that “we advocated for a European and international solution 
from the beginning. The federal government has said that very early on. But the 
resistance continues.”  Another Congressman said that he has “a firm belief that [we] 
need a European solidarity project. And it cannot be that some countries shy away from 
this responsibility and move away from solidarity.”344 A Congresswoman said 
“everybody was calling for leadership. But they didn’t want the [liberal] leadership that 
Germany had to offer.” This was reaffirmed by another Congresswoman when she 
stated that “it has been very frustrating, to try and try all over again to find consensus on 
[liberal] and fairer measures such as a quota or a resettlement system. For a year now.” 
A Congressman expressed similar frustration indicating that “we have been trying to 
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develop a quota system. However, I don’t see this working any time soon or at all. If 
you think that, considering the severity of the crisis and people suffering which clearly 
calls for an extraordinary [liberal] response, 28 states could not get it together to find a 
unilateral, humanitarian solution. So no – I don’t see it working.”345 A local politician 
added that “this is the actual scandal. That Europe says: Let the Germans take care of 
it.”346  
When it comes to reasons why there is such a persistent lack of solidarity, 
interviewees named a variety of factors. While media sources and civil society reports 
have cited economic, security, and to some extent, cultural factors as the main reasons 
for the lack of solidarity amongst European countries, it appears that Germany’s 
unilateral approach as discussed above as well as the adherence to ingrained, 
conservative rules also figured centrally.347 The reluctance to adopt a unified liberal 
approach goes therefore beyond consequentialist factors. Eastern European leaders 
appealed to a different set of norms in order to justify not accepting more refugees. 
They argued that a resettlement and quota system violated the traditional European 
asylum system and their sovereign right to regulate immigration.348 The Hungarian 
Prime Minister Victor Orban repeatedly stressed obligations to protect his citizens and 
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safeguard the eastern European borders. He stated “This is not the time for solidarity 
but to enforce the law. Illegal immigration is an offense.”349 Interviewees also 
connected the lack of solidarity with the dissatisfaction of European partners over 
Germany’s unilateral approach. One local politician said that “of course, Germany 
wanted to impose something on Europe that most countries did not want. So why 
should these other countries help if they were ignored?”350 A Congresswoman 
reaffirmed this and stated that “we initiated something that we knew our neighbors did 
not support, so they said: ok Germany, you started this, you will deal with this.”351 
Other interviewees pointed towards the adherence to longstanding, conservative 
European asylum system that led to the lack of solidarity. One Congressman said “of 
course these [eastern] countries are economically not as strong as Germany or France. 
But that is an easy way out and not the whole explanation. I think that many countries 
don’t want to let go of our traditional approach,” referring to both national and regional, 
conservative migration policy frameworks.352 A Congresswoman echoed this 
explanation for the lack of solidarity and added that “the European history is 
characterized by isolationist migration and asylum polices, so we are also talking about 
path dependency here.”353 Another Congresswoman indicated that “the focus [of our 
European partners] is basically the continuation of the asylum system as it was in the 
past.”354 One civil society representative confirmed this and stated that “many reactions 
on the European level signal a fortress Europe policy – so nothing new.” In addition to 
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the lack of solidarity amongst European states, a few Congressional representatives and 
local politicians criticized the absence of practical support from international actors. 
One Congress member said “where are the other big players? America, Russia, or even 
some of the Arabic nations? Just saying ‘Good job, Germany’ is not enough.”355 A local 
politician added that “it would have strengthened our [liberal] approach a lot more if 
other actors, non-European, had come through.”356 In a parliamentary debates, 
Congressional representatives also pointed out the inaction of international players. One 
Congress member stated that it would be “a strong signal if Russia and the USA would 
initiate talks with Europeans and regional powers” to find a solution.357 Another one 
said it “is a shame that the really rich Muslim countries on the Gulf do not at all take 
care of these [fleeing] people and thus far have not accepted a single refugee,” while 
another indicted that “the global community does decidedly too little to approach the 
root causes.”358   
Study participants connected the lack of solidarity to the policy shift. Many 
expressed that upholding liberal refugee policies was unsustainable as it would have 
further damaged relations with member states and the overall European project. 
Germany’s unilateral approach disrupted the ontological security of European partners, 
and the lack of solidarity threatened the country’s identity as a central player in the EU. 
Furthermore, policy makers perceived the absence of solidarity as a result of violating 
longstanding European norms, and recognized that the liberal approach to asylum was 
not appropriate. One Congresswoman said that “you can’t continue if you have no 
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support and mainly criticism.”359 Another Congressional representative argued similarly 
indicating that “the lack of solidarity for our [initial] approach made us reconsider our 
policies. If nobody wants to do what we are doing, are we were really doing the right 
thing?” She added, “You can’t be a leader, if nobody follows.” 360 This was repeated by 
another Congress member who raised the question “are we upholding and defending 
European rules, or are we endangering them with our liberal approach?” So decision 
makers interpreted the lack of solidarity and the continued rise in political tensions as 
both costly and inappropriate. When Germany started to reintroduce a stricter approach, 
the willingness of European states to cooperate on managing the refugee crisis increased 
again. This has also been pointed out in civil society reports and newspaper articles. The 
Carnegie Institute insinuated that after months of confrontation, the EU was finally able 
to agree on a common approach: that of bringing down refugee numbers and restricting 
access to Europe.361 Media sources have identified the reluctance to agree on a liberal 
approach and to follow the German example as decisive factor for the policy change.362 
Der Tagesspiegel wrote that “leadership without followers does not work. [Merkel] has 
to modify her isolationist position and find some middle ground in the EU.”363 As a 
result, many policy makers pushed the discontinuation of the liberal agenda by 
highlighting that a return to conservative policies was consistent with other standards of 
appropriate behavior.”364 In parliamentary debates, congressional members appealed to 
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existing, conservative norms and practices and pushed for a return to more restrictive 
measures. One member advocated for “more consequent deportations,”365 and another 
one stated “we need to make sure to address problems with Dublin II and III.”366 
Another Congressional representative noted that 
The protection for refugees is basically possible and acceptable in all states of 
the EU and in all states that are contract to the refugee convention. It is therefore 
essential in the next weeks and months to restore the rule of law in the whole 
European Union so that all members follow the European asylum legislation, the 
Dublin regulation, the Schengen regulation, and the Eurodac regulation.367 
Merkel announced changes to her initial refugee approach and indicted more deterrent 
policies including “strengthening of Frontex (…) improving the repatriation quota (…) 
and sending clear signals to people in crisis areas that we can’t accept more 
refugees.”368  
Overall, actors appealed to national, regional and international refugee norms in 
order to promote their preferred policy response while simultaneously undermining the 
adverse side. However, they also recognized the validity of alternative sets of norms. 
Besides using national norms and values, actors used European and international laws 
and rules in order to strengthen domestic policy preferences and express appropriate 
behavior. They simultaneously aimed to articulate that their policies were less costly. 
However, the question of why the clash of norms turned out favorably for conservative 
actors, and why conservative refugee norms and policies succeeded over liberal refugee 
norms and policies remains and will be addressed in the following section.  
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Analysis of Themes 
 In this section, I will first discuss how the main themes relate to one another in 
an effort to establish their relevance in the decision making process. I will then offer an 
explanation for Germany’s shift to more restrictive policies.  
 As illustrated in the empirical study, actors appealed to conservative or liberal 
norms depending on their policy preferences. However, it also appears that actors 
recognized different, alternative sets of norms. For example, conservative actors 
acknowledged the importance of liberal refugee norms and stressed that such norms are 
integrated in conservative policies. Liberal actors also admitted the validity of 
conservative norms and emphasized the country’s obligation to its own citizens.  
  Actors reinforced national norms by mentioning regional and/or international 
norms. Norm competition occurred horizontally within the domestic arena, but also 
vertically between the national and European level.369 As an example, conservative 
politicians promoted more restrictive policies by stressing the importance of the Dublin 
Regulation and by applying a narrower reading of international refugee law. Supporters 
of the liberal refugee policies cited European human rights and refugee law as well as a 
dynamic interpretation of the refugee convention. Liberal actors framed the restoration 
of conservative policies as both costly and inappropriate using national, regional, and 
international norms.370 However, conservative actors countered these efforts by 
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referring to long-standing, multi-level norms claiming that the continuation of liberal 
policies is even more costly and inappropriate.   
When it comes to the costs, the theme of security and economics becomes 
relevant. Although all actors recognized and addressed economic and security related 
costs, they interpreted and stressed different aspects depending on which norms they 
had internalized and prioritized. Conservative actors frequently quoted the strain on 
public services as well as the increased terrorist risk, while liberal actors focused on the 
lack of liberal integration measures and the rise in hate crimes as the most disruptive 
economic and security consequences. In regards to ascribing appropriateness to the 
refugee policies, liberal actors continued to argue that taking in refugees and expanding 
liberal measures is the most appropriate behavior considering European values. On the 
other hand, conservative actors highlighted that Germany’s unilateral approach and the 
lack of communication and transparency violated both national and regional procedural 
rules. Within Germany, local communities and civil society organizations heavily 
criticized the inconsistent flow of information or the absence of communication, which 
intensified the perception of uncertainty and disrupted ontological security. Similarly on 
the EU level, Germany’s move to suspend the Dublin system without coordination 
irritated its neighbors and presented an unexpected, inappropriate policy response. In 
the past, Germany had requested members’ strict adherence to regulations such as 
Dublin and was reluctant to accept any change to the existing, restrictive asylum 
system. Therefore, the suspension came at a surprise and was seen as inappropriate, 
disrupting the EU’s ontological security. The data also illustrates that the lack of 
solidarity amongst European states has roots beyond the commonly referenced security 
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and economic aspects. The above mentioned violation of procedural rules and 
disruption of ontological security as a result of Germany’s unilateral, uncoordinated 
approach also figured centrally in the decrease in European solidarity and the reluctance 
to accept a more liberal response to the refugee crisis. Hence, the vertical and horizontal 
norm interaction shows how actors framed and perceived material factors differently. 
This in combination with Germany’ unilateral approach intensified the solidarity gap 
amongst European partners. What remains is the question, why the German government 
eventually shifted away from its liberal policy approach and restored more conservative 
policies? 
 In the light of increased material costs, lack of solidarity, and criticisms for the 
unilateral open door agenda, the German government perceived the continuation of 
liberal policies as too costly and inappropriate (for a visualization see figure 3.1.).371 
Conservative actors illustrated that a return to a restrictive policy framework is in line 
with alternative sets of norms and therefore more appropriate. They also framed 
conservative policies as less costly in regards to economic and material factors as well 
as for Germany’s reputation an identity. 
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Figure 3.1. Logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences used by conservative 
actors  
 
First, conservative actors argued that Germany had a working asylum legislation 
and relied and promoted the Dublin system for decades. This structured process created 
reliability and shared expectations during both non-crisis and crisis times which allowed 
actors to predict and control material costs and plan accordingly. Conservative actors 
stressed that the liberal approach, which included an unlimited acceptance of refugees 
and the allocation of additional resources, presented an unsustainable burden on the 
federal and local economic system. Additionally, with the increase in refugees who 
received little to no screening when traveling to Central Europe, Germany and its 
neighbors were facing a new, heightened security situation. They emphasized that 
liberal policies were inadequate in addressing the economic and security concerns and 
that a continuation of the liberal approach would likely exacerbate the current 
situation.372 Conservative actors also emphasized that more restrictive refugee policies 
on the national and European level followed the basic provision of refugee protection 
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and did not blatantly violate human rights and refugee law in order to address the 
concerns of pro-refugee actors.373 They also utilized different sets of norms such as 
obligations owed to citizens in order to promote conservative policies. Second, 
conservative actors weaponized Germany’s unilateral approach and lack of 
communication and highlighted that these practices broke with long-standing national 
and regional refugee norms.374 They stressed that the liberal approach violated 
procedural rules in a way that the entire European project was threatened. And since 
almost no other European or international actor applied such liberal refugee measures, 
they did not reflect the appropriate behavior. Therefore, conservative actors advocated 
for the restoration of more restrictive refugee policies as they aligned with regional and 
international norms and practices and reflected the most appropriate behavior.  
While liberal actors tried to contest the conservatives’ push towards more 
restrictive measures and provide counter frames, they had a difficult time illustrating 
how the continuation of the liberal approach would alleviate short term and long-term 
material costs.375 Instead of offering a solution to the concern of the German society and 
European member states regarding the uncontrolled, increasing influx of refugees, many 
liberal actors aimed to further advance and expand liberal policies. Although liberal 
actors still received ample support from a large portion of the German society, 
restrictive voices became increasingly louder, creating a much more heterogeneous 
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policy making environment.376 The failure to adequately respond to the multitude of 
criticisms and concerns on the local, national, and regional level weakened the 
argument of the liberal approach as the most appropriate policy reaction and intensified 
the perception of costliness. In addition, some liberal actors actually acknowledged the 
changed economic and security situation, and while they censured the lack of European 
solidarity, they also expressed sympathy for peripheral member states. Hence, liberal 
actors’ continued to frame a liberal approach as appropriate even though increased 
criticisms and concerns seemed to call for a policy adjustment.  
Overall, the analysis of Germany’s motivations for restoring more restrictive 
refugee policies illustrates how norms interact vertically and horizontally. Depending 
on which sets of norms actors internalized and prioritized, they perceived economic and 
security risks as well as the appropriateness of their own and other policies differently. 
However, there is still some variation within different camps, and actors consider 
alternative sets of norms and give validity to contradicting norms and rules.  
It also became apparent how actors utilize framing in order to promote their 
preferred policies. Conservative actors framed their policy changes in a way that 
appealed to a broad spectrum of actors including local communities, refugee supporters, 
and European partners and were therefore able to provide a more sophisticated policy 
framework and a response to a multitude of concerns and criticisms. Liberal actors on 
the other side failed to show how the material costs of continuing Germany’s open door 
policy could be controlled and limited, and why liberal policies were appropriate in the 
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light of decreasing solidarity and support. Policy makers also acknowledged alternative 
sets of norms such as the obligations owed to citizens. Ultimately, the policy shift was 
triggered because the German government perceived the continuation of the liberal 
policy agenda was both costly and inappropriate. This case study is an example of how 
mixed motives play a role in social situations. Only by considering both logic of 
consequences and logic of appropriateness, I was able to unpack the multi-layered 
factors that triggered the policy shift. Therefore, future research should explore the role 
of mixed motives in decision making processes more rigorously.   
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Conclusion 
 
In the previous chapters, I investigated Germany’s refugee policy framework 
during 2015 and 2016. As illustrated, the decision making process was influenced by a 
variety of actors, who utilized norms and rules in order to advance their preferred 
policies. I will briefly review the two puzzles, before discussing the significance and 
contributions to IR literature. I will then conclude by reviewing implications and 
proposing avenues of future research.  
Review of Puzzles 
From a rationalist perspective, it is puzzling why Germany initially introduced 
such a liberal refugee agenda, thereby reversing its long-standing conservative refugee 
policy framework. While some might argue that refugees will add economic benefits 
and stabilize the country’s social security system, empirical data shows that material 
factors only played a peripheral role in the decision making process. Instead, actors 
across the political spectrum emphasized the country’s liberal values and norms, moral 
responsibility, as well as leadership role in order to push for the liberalization of refugee 
policies. All major media outlets covered the severity of the humanitarian crisis and 
depicted the suffering of refugees. Additionally, the crisis in the Middle East, refugees 
travelling to Europe, and Germany’s national and international obligations to grant 
asylum presented a clear causal chain that enabled actors to identify Germany’s 
responsibility to help refugees. Both the risk of bodily harm and the clear casual chain 
led to the mobilization of a broad spectrum of actors who appealed to liberal norms and 
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values and demanded an open door policy.377 However, some actors contested the push 
towards liberal policies and appealed to different norms that highlighted Germany’s 
responsibility to its own citizens. These actors opposed the liberal policy framework 
because it clashed with the long-standing, conservative asylum system on the national 
and regional level. This illustrates how actors used different norms to either support or 
oppose the introduction of liberal refugee policies.  
The interaction of different norms becomes even more apparent during the shift 
from liberal to more restrictive policies. In mid-September 2015, Germany started 
reversing its open door policies and reinstated a more conservative approach. This 
represents a puzzle for constructivists because the factors that contributed to the liberal 
policy agenda still remained. While rationalists might highlight that the reintroduction 
of restrictive policies is a straight forward story of the country reversing a costly policy 
decision, the empirical data suggests an explanation beyond the consequentialist 
perspective. Actors appealed to different norms in order to promote their preferred 
policy approach. Liberal actors argued for the continuation of the liberal agenda by 
utilizing domestic, regional, and international refugee protection norms and rules. 
Conservative actors on the other hand framed the return to the traditional, restrictive 
policy framework as less costly and more appropriate. However, there was also some 
variation within the camps, and some actors recognized alternative sets of norms and 
attributed validity to contradicting norms and rules. The policy shift was eventually 
triggered because decision makers recognized severe material and reputational 
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consequences if the country were to continue its liberal policies. The absence of 
European solidarity as well as the increasing criticisms of Germany’s unilateral 
approach from national and regional actors made the country reevaluate the 
appropriateness of its liberal policies. Therefore, both logic of consequences and logic 
of appropriateness help explain the policy shift. 
Significance and Contributions to IR Literature 
 The empirical findings of this study illustrate how different sets of norms 
interact vertically and horizontally. While rule systems might be well-established, they 
are incomplete and unable to cover every situation.378 This leads to arguments amongst 
actors on how to interpret norms and which policies to implement. Further, the 
existence of overlapping refugee and asylum norms - the refugee regime complex – 
leaves room for more than one permissible interpretation and policy prescription.379 
Germany’s policy response to the refugee crisis, the initiation of liberal policies and the 
shift back to more restrictive measures, therefore represents a fascinating case-study on 
the complexity of normative systems. It shows that policy makers not only encounter 
one single, isolated norm, but rather that they face different overlapping norms and 
rules on the same issue area.  
 What is particularly interesting in this case study is the role of the regional 
asylum and migration system. While research has investigated different normative 
systems on different levels as well as cross-level norm interaction, regional norms have 
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not often been an explicit object of study.380 The existing literature tends to treat all 
norms beyond the state as international, which somewhat homogenizes different sets of 
norms and rules. However, the European refugee and asylum system is well-established 
and strongly influences state decisions. It certainly incorporates different sets of 
international conservative and liberal refugee norms. However, the European system is 
distinct because it institutionalizes broad international norms into specific, binding 
policy prescriptions. As a result, regional normative systems may act as an independent 
barrier or catalyzer for norm diffusion as well as for national policy making.  
The development of Germany’s refugee agenda also illustrates the importance of 
both logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness. Much literature has created a 
clear distinction between these two concepts, and research tends to emphasize one over 
the other when explaining decision making processes.381 In reality, however, it is much 
more likely that mixed motives drive policy debates and decisions. Particularly when it 
comes to shifts in policy frameworks due to unexpected events or crises, policy makers 
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tend to consider a variety of factors in order to anticipate the consequences as well as 
the appropriateness of their decisions.382  
Implications and Avenues of Future Research 
 With the intensification of conflict, economic instability, and environmental 
suffering, the number of people mobilizing and migrating will likely continue. This 
global displacement crisis poses a challenge to states’ immigration systems and to 
fundamental principles such as state sovereignty and the responsibility to protect 
citizens. States will have to reevaluate the sustainability of their asylum and refugee 
policy framework in the light of increasing normative conflict and competing 
interpretations. The current policies and prospective responses to refugee movements 
will be decisive for the future of refugee protection norms and rules. Normative conflict 
and the lack of consensus will trigger future arguments, and their outcomes will result 
in continuous rule modification.383 If actors continue to restrict access to asylum and 
apply a narrow reading of international and regional refugee law, the parameters of 
refugee protection might be weakened and even altered.384 This greatly compromises 
the right to asylum and the quality of protection and might escalate current 
humanitarian crises or potentially create new ones.     
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 In regard to expanding current IR scholarship, future research should continue to 
investigate case studies that illustrate how actors use different sets of norms in policy 
debates and thereby influence decision making. Recent scholarship has recognized the 
gap between simplistic theoretical models of norm emergence and diffusion and their 
applicability to case studies. Many experts have therefore started to bridge this gap by 
connecting theory with empirical evidence. However, our understanding of when and 
why particular norms are activated, why some norms appear to be stronger than others, 
as well as the overall process of normative conflicts and their outcomes is still 
embryonic. While some research has identified crises or unexpected situations to be a 
frequent trigger of norm contestation, this is not enough to account for other instances 
of normative change.385 Future research should therefore more rigorously explore under 
which circumstances certain norms are stronger than others, and how and why some 
normative arguments lead to policy changes while others do not.   
Furthermore, there is too little distinction between different sets of norms and 
rules. The underdevelopment of this distinction creates two specific problems. First, 
researchers overlook norms and rules that might only be remotely related to an issue 
area, but which indirectly or at least partly affect the policy making process. The 
emerging humanitarian regime, which is often not directly associated with the refugee 
regime, is a good example. One aspect of the humanitarian regime is to address root 
causes of migration and help internally displaced persons. While this regime might be 
able to expand refugee protection to people who have been excluded under the current 
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legal framework, it could also be utilized by conservative actors to push for protection 
close to conflict zones rather than in Europe.386 Thus far, empirical studies on norm 
interactions lack the inclusion of different norms and rules and their effect on other 
norms, actors and policy making.  Second, norms on the same subject area tend to be 
generalized, although they might be distinct in scope and purpose. The refugee and 
human rights regimes complement each other, however, they cannot be homogenized. 
Grouping these two regimes together without distinction undermines their individual 
strength as well as their increased power when actors utilize them to promote policies 
on the same subject area. This cross-normative appealing process contributes to the 
development of the respective regimes and advances their scope and purpose. 
Therefore, the effect of overlapping norms is important, but distinguishing between 
them helps explain how they reinforce one another and are strategically combined by 
actors in their efforts to achieve particular policy outcomes. Future research should 
further conceptualize the differences as well as commonalities of rule systems in order 
to illustrate how they are utilized by actors, and to what extent they influence the policy 
making process.      
 Overall, investigating Germany’s policy response to the 2015/16 refugee crisis 
contributes to the IR literature as it illustrates the complex interaction of norms and 
rules on a sensitive subject area such as asylum. It furthermore operationalizes existing 
theoretical models by connecting them to the dynamic refugee policy making process. 
The findings of the case study not only confirm and reinforce theoretical arguments, but 
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also advance the theoretical debate by identifying gaps in the literature and posing new 
questions for the way forward.  
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